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This Article makes observations on the concept of
sovereignty; we suggest that the concept be studied
using the contextual mapping method articulated by
the New Haven School of jurisprudence. We observe
tension in applying the concept to developing and
developed states, and explore the possibility that
sovereignty can be abused. We propose state
typologies to explore the concept further and to
scrutinize the accommodations of authority and
control.
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[T]here exists perhaps no conception, the meaning of which is more controversial than that of
sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this conception, from the moment when it was




This Article explores the changing character of sovereignty in
international law and international relations.' International lawyers
may wonder whether this conservative, apparently vastly overwritten
subject might still provoke intellectual curiosity. It seems
counterintuitive to presume that we might shed new light on such a
venerable concept. However, the goal of this Article is indeed to
bring new understanding to this important idea.
We cannot offer a single definition of "sovereignty." 3  The
term is widely used-and not always used in the same way-by
1. 1 LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 137 (Sir Arnold D. McNair ed., 4th ed.
1928).
2. This Article is based upon a public lecture given by Professor Nagan on March 8,
2003, at the University of Asmara, Eritrea.
3. Scholars have also characterized the concept of sovereignty as variable. Among
them, Professor Louis Henkin has written extensively on the subject. Specifically, Henkin
argues that sovereignty "means many things, some essential, some insignificant; some
agreed, some controversial; some that are not warranted and should not be accepted." Louis
HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8 (1995). This variable nature of
sovereignty has been interpreted as detrimental to the development of international law and
international relations. Henkin has written that "[s]overeignty is a bad word, not only
because it has served terrible national mythologies; in international relations, and even in
international law, it is often a catchword, a substitute for thinking and precision." Id. Henkin
suggests that the concept of sovereignty be entirely disposed of, asserting that "[f]or legal
purposes at least, we might do well to relegate the term sovereignty to the shelf of history as
a relic from an earlier era." Id. at 10. He reasons:
As applied to states in their relations with other states, 'sovereignty' is a
mistake. Sovereignty is essentially an internal concept, the locus of ultimate
authority in a society . .. . Surely, as applied to the modem secular state in
relation to other secular states, it is not meaningful to speak of the state as
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scholars, journalists, practical politicians, international civil servants,
jurists, and others from widely divergent cultural traditions,
professions, and intellectual disciplines.4 It may mean different things
to different people living in different cultures throughout different
periods (historically and contemporaneously) who practice (and
practiced) different specialized or professional competences.5 It may
have different meanings in jurisprudence, political science, history,
philosophy, and other related fields. The following list provides some
examples of the different, though overlapping, meanings given to the
term:
* Sovereignty as a personalized monarch (real or ritualized);6
* Sovereignty as absolute, unlimited control or power;7
* Sovereignty as political legitimacy;8
" Sovereignty as political authority;9
4. See id. at 4 (discussing multiple meanings of sovereignty); see also CAROLINE
THOMAS, NEW STATES, SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERVENTION 11 (1985) (discussing sovereignty
as a political concept which later became transformed). For an alternative viewpoint, see
STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 43-72 (1999) (discussing the
multifaceted nature of sovereignty).
5. See W. Michael Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary
International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 866 (1990) (relating the sweeping history and diverse
nature of sovereignty cross-culturally, stating that it has many "meanings, hues and tones"
which depend upon the individuals who invoke it).
6. With regard to monarchic sovereignty, it has been argued that subjects voluntarily
comply with royal edicts because they accept as valid the source of the monarchy's (i.e. the
rulemaking institution's) claim to the exercise of authority. To illustrate, Professors Falk and
Strauss observed that "the Fifteenth Century English citizenry might have complied with a
royal decree criminalizing the practice of witchcraft either because the citizenry believed that
witchcraft was evil or because it accepted as valid the claimed source of the crown's
lawmaking authority-that is, that the monarch was appointed by God." See Richard Falk &
Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power
of Popular Sovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191, 207 (2000).
7. To Sixteenth Century French jurist and natural law philosopher Jean Bodin,
majestas (i.e. sovereignty) could be equated with absolute power. See JEAN BODIN, THE SIX
BOOKS OF A COMMONWEALE 84 (Kenneth D. McRae ed., Richard Knolles trans., 1962). In
Appendix B, Kenneth McRae supplies the French and Latin definitions of vocabulary
employed by Bodin to express major concepts. Majestas is equated with sovereignty at A75.
8. Political systems require machinery to exact compliance with decrees made by a
State's ruling authority. Sovereignty bestows legitimacy on State exercises of power. See
THOMAS, supra note 4, at 11 (giving the political implications of the concept of sovereignty).
See generally Falk & Strauss, supra note 6 (exploring the issue of legitimacy in democratic
processes and institutions of States in the global community).
9. The definition of "sovereignty" is, in part, "the supreme political authority of an
independent state." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1402 (7th ed. 1996). "Sovereign power" is
defined as "the power to make and enforce laws." Id. at 1401. A contemporary definition of
"State" was offered by Opinion No. 1 of the Badinter Commission (Commission d'Arbitrage
de la Conference de la Paix en Yougoslavie) and requires "a population subject to an
organized political authority." Conference on Yugoslavia Arbitration Commission:
Opinions on Questions Arising from the Dissolution of Yugoslavia, Opinion No. 1, 31 I.L.M.
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" Sovereignty as self-determined, national independence;10
" Sovereignty as governance and constitutional order;1"
" Sovereignty as a criterion of jurisprudential validation of all
law (Grundnorm, rule of recognition, sovereign);12
* Sovereignty as the juridical personality of sovereign
equality;13
" Sovereignty as international recognition; 4
* Sovereignty as a formal unit of a legal system;15
1488, 1495 (1992).
10. See Claudio Grossman & Daniel D. Bradlow, Are We Being Propelled Towards a
People-Centered Transnational Legal Order?, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 1 (1993)
(asserting that a core principle of sovereignty is that each nation-State is the autonomous
master of all that occurs within its territory); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7 (declaring
that state autonomy must be preserved in international law).
11. See MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE MARIE BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE
SOVEREIGN STATE 11, 20-24 (1995) (stating that sovereignty is a "handy tool" when
employed by internal constitutional systems to defend the independence of the State).
12. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97-114 (1961) (suggesting that the "rule
of recognition" is the primary rule that establishes the certain parties or organizations, such as
a monarchy, as rulemaking institutions). The foundation of the German constitutional state is
its Grundgesetz (Basic Law), which is an intricately structured framework of rules and
values. Each constitutional provision manifests a binding legal norm that obliges complete,
unequivocal implementation. The Constitution represents the Grundnorm, or basic norm,
which governs and validates the legal order. Accordingly, any law or practice that is not
reconcilable with the Basic Law is by definition unconstitutional. See generally HANS
KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE 115 (1961).
13. Ian Brownlie claims that the importance of sovereignty stems from its relationship
to the "equality of states [which] represent[s] the basic constitutional doctrine of the law of
nations." See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 287 (4th ed.
1990). For an alternate point of view, see KRASNER, supra note 4, at 43-72. Krasner
discusses two forms of sovereignty: "Westphalian sovereignty" and "international legal
sovereignty." Id. at 9-25. His conception of "Westphalian sovereignty" is a state's total
exclusion of all external actors from any position of authority within the state's boundaries.
Id. at 20. His conception of "international legal sovereignty" is simply any legal capacity
derived from mutual state recognition. Id. at 14. He argues that under the banner of
sovereignty, states pursue their individual interests in an environment characterized by a
severe imbalance of power. Id. at 16. Specifically, he wrote that "[n]either Westphalian nor
international legal sovereignty has ever been a stable equilibrium from which rulers had no
incentives to deviate." Id. at 24. In other words, he postulates that the norms of sovereignty
are inconsequential because they do not constrain state behavior.
14. The legitimacy of sovereignty might be based on the "rule of recognition," which is
that which establishes rule-making institutions. See HART, supra note 12, at 97 (explaining
that some laws are backed by threats of the sovereign and other laws are based on a system of
primary rules of obligation). See also HERSH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4-6 (1946) (distinguishing the viewpoint that an entity that satisfies the
criteria of statehood is bound to legal rights and duties under international law whether or not
other states recognize it from the viewpoint that only the act of recognition by already
recognized states can transform unrecognized entities into sovereign states subject to
international law). See generally Michael Scharf, Musical Chairs: The Dissolution of States
and Membership in the United Nations, 28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 29 (1995).
15. For example, national sovereignty figures into domestic legal systems by way of the
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" Sovereignty as legal immunities; 16
" Sovereignty as jurisdictional competence to make and/or
apply law; 7 and
" Sovereignty as basic governance competencies (constitutive
process). 8
direct applicability of treaties. Many international law scholars point to the successful
interplay between state autonomy and international governance functions manifested by
multilateral treaty regimes. Specifically, Hersh Lauterpacht identifies the "subjection of the
totality of international relations to the rule of law" as the primary feature of the Grotian
conception of international society. Hersh Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in
International Law, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 19 (1946). Similarly, Harold Hongju Koh
favors "a thoroughgoing account of transnational legal process: the complex process of
institutional interaction whereby global norms are not just debated and interpreted, but
ultimately internalized by domestic legal systems." Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2602 (1997). Other scholars, such as Chayes
and Chayes, identify a new type of sovereignty, which is created by the interpenetration of
multilateral treaty regimes across sovereign borders. Specifically, they argue that "to be a
player, the state must submit to the pressures that international regulations impose...
[because] sovereignty ... is status-the vindication of a state's existence as a member of the
international system." ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW
SOVEREIGNTY 27 (1995).
16. Until Nuremberg, the prosecution of individuals for crimes against humanity was
precluded by the lack of an applicable international penal code. See BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A STEP TOWARDS WORLD PEACE 10-11 (1980). At that
time, sovereignty was generally accepted as a symbol of the unconditional power and breadth
of the privileges enjoyed by sovereign heads of state, which traditionally included immunity
from the criminal jurisdiction of foreign courts. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW: A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL CODE 10-11 (1980). This changed
only after the atrocities of World War II. See id. Sovereignty can still be construed as a
symbol of the powers, privileges, and immunities enjoyed by State officials, but it is no
longer absolute and extends only to "[State] actions ... which are covered by public law," or
jus imperii. See Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case No. 137/1997
(Court of First Instance of Leivadia, Greece, 1997), at 10.
17. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court crafted a standard for personal jurisdiction in
1877, which it created by correlating a state's sovereign interests to that state's territorial
boundaries. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer established that a state
could exercise jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, so long as this defendant was
served with process within the forum. Id. at 722 (holding that "no tribunal ... can extend its
process beyond [the State's own] territory so as to subject either persons or property to its
decisions").
18. As part of the novel perspective regarding international legal scholarship, Harold
Lasswell and Myres McDougal shifted their attention away from pure positivism-which
basically views international law with reference to the formal criterion of what the law
simply is, independent of moral or ethical considerations-toward a more policy-oriented
constitutive approach. This new method avoids positivism's highly formal effort to grasp the
concept of law based exclusively on rules. Rather, it views international law through the lens
of decision-making, so that actors in the global community can illuminate and apply their
common interests according to their individual expectations of what best constitutes an
appropriate process and how to most effectively control certain behavior. See, e.g., Myres S.
McDougal & W. Michael Reisman, The Prescribing Function in the World Constitutive
Process: How International Law Is Made, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS 355, 360-62
(Myres S. McDougal & W. Michael Reisman eds., 1981).
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Conceptions of sovereignty are derived from various sources.
For example, one of the conceptions of sovereignty identifies it with
ultimate, effective political power, and another conception identifies it
with the nature of law itself.9 The identification of sovereignty with
power stems from the political culture.2" The identification of
sovereignty with law stems from jurisprudence and the legal culture,21
19. John Austin regarded law as a command from a sovereign. According to Austin, to
interpret a legal system, one must first identify a sovereign or a person or group of people
who habitually obey(s) no one, and whose commands are habitually obeyed. See JOHN
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 199-212 (Wilfrid E. Rumble ed.,
1995) (1863).
20. Politics is the quintessential study of power in all its relevant social, economic,
cultural, and political dimensions. The phrase "political culture" captures the breadth of this
definition. See WALTER ROSENBAUM, POLITICAL CULTURE 5 (1975) (arguing that "[t]o say
that political culture involves the important ways in which people are subjectively oriented
toward the basic elements of their political system is an accurate but not yet satisfactory
definition"). See also GABRIEL ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL
ATTITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS 498 (1963) (stating that the development of a
stable and effective democratic government "depends upon more than the structures of
government and politics: it depends upon the orientations that people have to the political
process-[it depends] upon the political culture. Unless the political culture is able to
support a democratic system, the chances for the success of that system are slim.").
"Politics" is the study of decisions regarding primary values, such as the allocation of goods,
services, and honors in society. Politics, according to Professor Harold Lasswell, is the study
of "who gets what, when, and how." See generally HAROLD LASSWELL, POLITICS: WHO
GETS WHAT, WHEN, How (Meridian ed. 1958) [hereinafter LASSWELL, WHO GETS WHAT].
We might add one more term to Lasswell's formulation: "why?"
21. The definition of "law" should probably be partly included in the definition of
"politics" because it certainly seems that all law is politics but not all politics is law.
Vladimir Lenin, the distinguished Socialist, once wrote, "Law is a political tool; it is
politics." Vladimir I. Lenin, Concerning a Caricature of Marxism and Concerning
Imperialist Economism, in COLLECTED WORKS 79 (4th ed. 1949). Decisions that count as
"law" are those that allocate goods, honors and values through authoritative and controlling
procedures and institutions. Thus, decisions that constitute law must be political because for
them to be meaningful, some degree of control or efficacy is required. Those political
decisions which count as law must as well be accompanied by some symbol of legal
obligation of authority, or more precisely, an "authority signal." See W. Michael Reisman,
International Lawmaking: A Process of Communication, AM. SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 110
(1981) (arguing that the "authority signal" is the key element of the competence to prescribe
a rule, or more exactly, policy, the scope of which signal infuses law with a weak or strong
normative dimension.) "Law," though accompanied by the requisite authority, cannot be an
objective "fact" because it must be respected, honored, and enforced at an individual level.
See generally ANTHONY D'AMATO, JURISPRUDENCE: A DESCRIPTIVE AND NORMATIVE
ANALYSIS OF LAW 221-27 (1984) (arguing that law has inherent normativity). The
legitimacy of law is tied to its essential theoretical justification. Law must either
theoretically emanate from an authoritative source-the sovereign, the Grundnorm, or the
master rule of recognition-or it must emerge from the basic expectations about how
authority is constituted and continuously maintained in a State or body politic, which could
be communicated in a formal constitution or even a "living" constitutional arrangement.
Eugen Ehrlich, the father of the modem sociological school of law, developed the concept of
lebendes Recht (the "living law"), or unwritten law expressed in social conduct. EUGEN
EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 497 (1936). Ehrlich
asserted that living law "[i]s not the part of the content of the document that the courts
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which also finds the idea of authority to be an essential element of the
concept of operative sovereign power.
The continuing vitality of the concept of sovereignty is
evident. Indeed, sovereignty as the concept was developed in Europe
in the Seventeenth through Nineteenth Centuries is vigorously
asserted today by non-European states that historically operated with
the concept of empire rather than of sovereignty. For example, China
claims that Tibet22 and Taiwan23 are an integral part of Chinese
sovereignty.2 4  But is Chinese sovereignty-in its historical
tradition-the same sovereignty that is drawn from Europe's
historical experience, drawn from the emergence of European nation-
States? 25 The ancient Chinese State was an empire, whereas the
recognize as binding when they decide a legal controversy, but only that part which the
parties actually observe in life." Id. His exploration of the general function of "living law"
inspired other legal scholars to investigate the implications in specific societies. Specifically,
in 1941, Karl Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel published their account of the living law of
the Cheyenne Native Americans of Montana, which functioned as a kind of living
constitution. KARL LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY: CONFLICT
AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE (1941). They identified the "law-ways" of the
Cheyenne, which were not written down, but rather ascertained by the entire culture by way
of a comprehensive understanding of a series of disputes and "cases"--called the "trouble-
cases"- unique to the Cheyenne culture. See id. at 328-29. The subject matter of these
cases ranged from rectifying a dispute over ownership of stray horses to banishing a girl from
the community for aborting her unborn child. See id. at 118-19, 224-25. Essentially, law
must be understood within the context of the realities of human social life.
22. See J. R. V. PRESCOTT, POLITICAL FRONTIERS AND BOUNDARIES 36-51 (1987); J. R.
V. PRESCOTT ET AL., FRONTIERS OF ASIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 6-7 (1977); GERARD M.
FRITERS, OUTER MONGOLIA AND ITS INTERNATIONAL POSITION 183-93 (1949); ALASTAIR
LAMB, THE MCMAHON LINE: A STUDY IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA, CHINA, AND
TIBET, 1904-1914, at 436-56 (1966).
23. See generally Hans Kuijper, Is Taiwan a Part of China?, in THE INTERNATIONAL
STATUS OF TAIWAN IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER 9 (Jean-Marie Henckaerts ed., 1996).
24. Ever since the rise of nation-State, both international and humanitarian law have
been predominantly viewed through a Eurocentric lens, as opposed to more deep-rooted
views reflecting Chinese or Islamic perspectives. However, "[t]he theory that [international
and] humanitarian law [are] essentially 'Eurocentric' is in reality more a criticism of most
literature on the subject than a reflection of historical fact." See THE HANDBOOK OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 13 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995). Some principles of
international and humanitarian law are closely tied to recent political infrastructures in China,
India, Southwest Asia, and Japan. Indeed, some scholars argue that some alternative
conception of international law based on the Chinese tradition exists, though other scholars
do not share this viewpoint. See GREG AUSTIN, CHINA'S OCEAN FRONTIER 38-40 (1998).
China has, however, accepted traditional sources of international law, some of which
arguably comport with preexisting Chinese governmental principles. See YASH GHAI, HONG
KONG'S NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER: THE RESUMPTION OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE
BASIC LAW 431-32 (1st ed. 1997). More recently, in 1981, China published its first textbook
on international law; various Chinese universities have since promoted studies in
international law and Chinese scholars have also endeavored to "divorce the analysis of
international law from remnants of Marxian ideology." Id.
25. Throughout this Article, "State" with a capital "S" will refer to a sovereign nation.
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European State system and its legacy of sovereignty was an
outgrowth of and a reaction to the imperial tradition of the Holy
Roman Empire and those imperial bodies politic which sought to
expand their influence under color of Papal authority.26 Indeed,
European sovereign States emerged, in part, as a reaction to
sweeping, religion-oriented claims of imperial hegemony.27
This Article collects our reflections from several perspectives
on the changing concept of sovereignty. Part I proposes that the
method of contextual mapping, as developed by Professor Myres
McDougal and other members of the New Haven School, be applied
to the concept of sovereignty. Part II remarks on the role of the
United Nations (UN) Charter in both limiting and promoting
sovereignty. Part III offers an analysis of sovereignty under which
the International Criminal Court should be seen as promoting rather
than limiting sovereignty. Part IV observes the peculiar challenges
and promises that the concept of sovereignty holds out for the States
of Africa. Part V discusses how the theory behind the U.S.-led "war
on terror" implies a novel concept of sovereignty. Finally, Part VI
provides some observations on the notion of sovereignty presupposed
by the U.K. House of Lords' decision that former head of State
Augusto Pinochet is not protected by sovereign immunity from trial
for certain crimes.
26. Contemporary State legal systems are arguably still constrained by practices
entrenched in Christendom-era Western Europe. See MAIVAN LAM, AT THE EDGE OF STATE:
INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND SELF-DETERMINATION 86 (2000). The Treaty of Westphalia,
drafted and ratified in 1648, created the fundamental basis for states to become "sovereign
and independent" from the Holy Roman Empire, but it also brought an untidy merger of
government and religion. See ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD
38 (1986). The Treaty of Westphalia put an end to the Thirty Years' War in Europe and
replaced the ruling religious hierarchical structure dominated by the Pope and Holy Roman
Emperor with a horizontal structure of independent sovereign states that notionally possessed
equal legal legitimacy and authority. The existence of state sovereignty is typically traced to
the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which laid the juridical foundations of sovereign
independence for the European nation-State. See R.R. PALMER & JOEL COLTON, A HISTORY
OF THE MODERN WORLD 148 (7th ed. 1992) (stating that in international law, the Peace of
Westphalia initiated the current European Staatensystem, or system of sovereign states). See
Richard Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies: Prospects and Proposal, 84
YALE L.J. 969, 980-87 (1975). The text of the Treaty of Westphalia, reprinted in 1 MAJOR
PEACE TREATIES OF MODERN HISTORY 7 (Fred L. Israel ed., 1967).
27. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 15, at 93, 99-100 (discussing the Grotian concept of
international order as an order based on alternative to imperial hegemony).
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I. CONTEXT, MAPPING, AND THE MEANING OF
SOVEREIGNTY
Contextual mapping, a technique associated with the New
Haven School, 28 can be used to clarify the meaning and workings of
sovereignty. The technique is based on the principle that concepts
and terms are better understood when the contexts in which they are
used are better understood. We argue that contextual mapping shows
that among nation-States and within nation-States, the concept of
sovereignty is used as an instrument by which to establish and
maintain authority.
We may define nation-States by four essential characteristics.
First, traditional international law requires a State to control a
territorial base with determinable boundaries.29 Second, a State is
required to control a population connected by solidarity, loyalty, and
primary notions of group affiliation and identity.3" Third, there is the
related aspect of internal governance that requires a controlling
internal power and competencies. 3 The fourth traditional criterion is
28. The founding members of Yale's New Haven School examined how governing
hegemons manipulate social development and world public order. See generally HAROLD
LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS AND PERSONAL INSECURITY (1935). Consisting initially of
Harold Lasswell, Myres McDougal, and their colleagues, the New Haven School seeks to
illumine the world political process by ascertaining and examining meaningful cultural,
financial, psychological, and emblematic factors that lay beneath social behaviors. To track
this examination, the New Haven School created a comprehensive contextual mapping
system of human social structures. See generally LASSWELL, WHO GETS WHAT, supra note
20; see also HAROLD LASSWELL, WORLD POLITICS FACES ECONOMICS (1945); HAROLD
LASSWELL & ABRAHAM KAPLAN, POWER AND SOCIETY: A FRAMEWORK OF POLITICAL
INQUIRY (1950); HAROLD LASSWELL & MYRES McDOUGAL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE
SOCIETY (1992).
29. Phillip Jessup, U.S. Representative to the Security Council, remarked on the
definition of a State to the UN that:
[t]he reason for the rule that one of the necessary attributes of a state is that it
shall possess territory is that one cannot contemplate a state as a kind of
disembodied spirit. Historically, the concept is one of insistence that there must
be some position of the earth's surface which its people inhabit and over which
its government exercises authority.
U.N. SCOR, 383rd mtg., Supp. No. 128, at 9-12 (1948). See also NIl LANTE WALLACE-
BRUCE, CLAIMS TO STATEHOOD IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (1994).
30. This emerging human element is the foundation of community norm generation.
See generally Georg Simmel, Social Interaction as the Definition of the Group in Time and
Space, in INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY 348 (Robert E. Park & Ernest W.
Burgess eds., 3d ed. 1924).
31. A State may be characterized as "an autonomous territorial and political unit having
a central government with coercive power over men and wealth." See Henry T. Wright,
Toward an Explanation of the Origin of the State, in EXPLANATION OF PREHISTORIC CHANGE
215, 217 (James N. Hill ed., 1977) (citing Robert L. Carneiro, A Theory of the Origin of the
State, 169 ScI. 733 (1970)).
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the requirement of a controlling power to represent the State or
territorially organized body politic in the international environment.3 2
However, the four traditional criteria obscure what is arguably the
most vital building block of the "State:" how authority is constituted.
Contextual mapping clarifies that process.
For the purpose of contextual mapping, the New Haven school
identified three fundamental processes: the social process, the power
process, and the constitutive process. The social process is simply the
activity of human beings seeking, through institutions (such as the
family), to promote their values. The power process is a specialized
aspect of the social process; it is the activity of human beings
pursuing power through institutions. The constitutive process is an
aspect of the power process; it is the process by which institutions for
the management of power are effectively and authoritatively
developed. More precisely, the constitutive process is the creation of
reasonably predictable expectations about the allocation of
fundamental decision-making authority. When the power process is
mapped onto the constitutive process we begin to observe the
emergence of authority in constituting fundamental power
arrangements, where authority is understood, in contradistinction
from power, as having a normative element.
To illustrate, any community exhibits contestations for power.
These contestations may take the form of violent rebellions or a
revolution. Suppose one side in the conflict wins. The winners will
seek to "constitute" or institutionalize their authority. They may have
won a battle, but winning the peace and stabilizing their power basis
may require more concrete formulations of the "authoritative" and
"controlling" aspects of power. Even if no clear winner emerges from
the conflict, the contesting parties may see that stabilizing their claims
and expectations about power is in their mutual self-interest.33 This is
because stabilizing expectations about how the basic institutions of
decision are established and continuously sustained are vital to the
constitution of power and its concurrent and subsequent
"recognition."34
From an empirical rather than a legal point of view,
32. A State may be identified by its ability to defend itself against external international
pressures or conflicts. See id. at 216-217.
33. Notwithstanding this process of vying for sovereign power over a community, it has
been argued that at least to some extent the beliefs of individual members of that community
are reflected in each act of their sovereign ruler. See generally Harold G. Maier,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private
International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280 (1982).
34. See HART, supra note 12, at 97, 110-11.
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constitutions, written or otherwise, are nothing but codified
expectations of authority and stability in contradistinction to the
prospect of continuous (even violent) conflict over how power and
authority are to be constituted and exercised. Realistically, conflict
and its polar opposite, collaboration, are present in all forms of social
organization; indeed, they have ever been ubiquitous in States and
societies. Even when authority is provided for in a formal
constitution, there shall always be conflict regarding the precise
allocations of power and competence. This means that even when the
high intensity violent conflict is contained, the settlement will be
fraught with contestations for power. Conflict cannot be banished
from human relations, but its form can change. Often, post-conflict
settlements generate situations of constructive conflict. Thus, some
forms of conflict may be socially beneficial. For example, economic
competition, as any capitalist knows, is a form of conflict35 that is
regarded as indispensable to economic development in market
systems. 36  Similarly, non-violent competition in democratic
governance is indispensable, not only to facilitate openness, but also
to further progress and change in society.
The constitutive process is continuous. But it does not render
irrelevant the similarly continuing process of conflict in accordance
with the constitution. There is an intuitive, ongoing relationship
between contestations for power and the constituting and stabilizing
of such contestations. Accordingly, the continuing constitutive
process shapes communication regarding conflict management and
collaboration to establish and maintain the basic political and juridical
institutions of effective and authoritative decision-making. 37
35. John Stuart Mill regarded economic competition as a legal sanction that harms
others and causes conflict. See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 251-54 (Stefan Collini ed.,
1989) (1859).
36. See SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE-THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN
THE WORLD ECONOMY 46 (1996) (arguing that "the world economy... has shifted the
balance of power away from states and toward [competitive] world markets"); see also
WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT 11-26 (1997) (discussing the emphasis on
competitive global capitalism).
37. From the perspective of the New Haven School, international lawmaking, or
prescription, is seen as a process of communication involving a communicator and a target
audience. The substance of this communication functions as signs or symbols of policy
content, symbols of authority, and symbols of controlling intention. These three signs or
symbols are: (1) the "policy content," which is the prescription, (2) the "authority signal,"
which is the legitimate basis from which to prescribe, and (3) the "control intention," which
is the enforcement power. In other words, a core philosophy of the
School is that in order to count as law, international law must have a prescriptive policy
content, it must be accompanied by symbols or signs indicative of widespread community
acceptance (because the community is the notional basis for authority in international law),
and it must be accompanied by a conception that some institutionalized control exists to
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One of the most important outcomes of the power process is
the patterns of communication regarding conflict and possible
collaboration. The understandings generated by power brokers in
their contestations for power frequently involve communications and
understandings about the limits, constitution and uses of power for
collaboration rather than conflict. From an observer's point of view,
a central feature of what is called "constitutional law" is its way of
institutionalizing expectations relating to the management of power in
the basic institutions of authoritative and controlling decision-making.
The understandings that emerge from the power process reflect the
development, however imperfect, of cultural forms that seek to
constrain excessive, destructive conflicts and to structure conflicts
productively.
Practical frameworks of communication and collaboration are
generated, and basic human expectations that, under scrutiny, may
reveal a "living" constitutional arrangement where cultural
expectations of how decision-making is fundamentally interwoven
with social organization are actually or behaviorally
constitutionalized.38 This might happen without a written constitution
and still be an effective instrument of constitutive authority.
Alternatively, the outcomes of social conflict, such as civil war, anti-
colonial wars, or agitation for self-determination, might lead to the
formulation of written expectations about the management of basic
decision-making competences in the political culture. In short,
conflict sometimes provokes the creation of a written constitution.
On the international stage, wars and multi-State conflicts have
historically stimulated the development of regional compacts and
mutual understandings. Indeed, perhaps the clearest example yet of a
global compact representing the parties' common interest is the UN
Charter.3 9
ensure that the prescribed law is real. See Myres S. McDougal et al., The World Constitutive
Process of Authoritative Decision, 19 J. LEGAL EDUC. 253 (1966-67). See also Reisman,
supra note 21, at 108-10 (1981) (discussing three aspects of prescriptive communication that
essentially convey legal norms because they designate policy that both emanates from a
source of authority and creates an expectation in the target audience that the policy content of
the communication is intended to control.)
38. See Walter O. Weyrauch, The "Basic Law" or "Constitution " of a Small Group, 27
J. Soc. ISSUEs 49, 56-58 (1971) (documenting an experiment in which several Berkeley
students were locked in a penthouse for three months. The focus of this experiment was the
evolutive character of law).
39. For example, the UN Charter identifies authoritative decision-makers and
procedures by which decisions might be made because it articulates a framework of practices
created to facilitate decisions in the interest of "[maintaining] peace and security," which, as
Professor W. Michael Reisman puts it, "[requires] more and more cooperation between large
and small states." See W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional Crisis in the United Nations,
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The world power process includes claims to become
sovereign, to remain sovereign, and to change or realign sovereign
competence. Mapping this process requires the identification of
operative participants in the world social and power processes, their
perspectives, demands, and expectations, their bases of power, the
situations in which they operate, their general strategies for action,
and the basic outcomes and effects of politically conditioned action.
One of the major outcomes of the process of effective power has been
the creation and maintenance of the institutions of authoritative
decision-making. n
Placing the concept of sovereignty within the map of the
social, power and constitutive processes, we find that sovereignty
reflects the allocation of fundamental decision-making competencies
about the basic institutions of governance itself. Within a nation-
State, it is the authorization and recognition of persons or institutions
competent to make basic decisions about governing power at all
levels. On the international stage, the stabilization of expectations in
political bodies with effective control over populations, territorial
bases, as well as over the instruments of internal governance and
external recognition leads to the creation of sovereignty with
independence and international legal personality.4"
87 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (1993). Professor Reisman goes on to assert, "The United Nations
Charter is only a part of [the] ongoing world constitutive process . I..." d  at 100. The New
Haven School, on the other hand, is not concerned with formal structures of government. It
instead remains focused on policy so that it can explore the interplay between law and the
world community through the lens of social processes. Specifically, the New Haven School
explores the processes of decision-making with specific regard to the "legal process, by
which... [McDougal and Lasswell meant] the making of authoritative and controlling
decisions." Myres S. McDougal and Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of
Diverse Systems of Public Order, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1959). The School's lead scholars
suggest that international law is a "world constitutive process of
authoritative decision," and not simply a conventional set of regulations, perhaps referring to
existing legal regimes such as the UN Charter. The goal of international law, the School's
founders argue, is the establishment of world public order by instituting regimes of effective
control and moving away from existing regimes of ineffective control. See
generally McDougal, supra note 37, at 253.
40. McDougal and Lasswell offer a configurative conception of jurisprudence that is
the end result of an authoritative decision-making process. See LASSWELL & McDOUGAL,
supra note 28, at 24-25. They argue that a scientifically grounded answer to any policy-
oriented problem can be reached that might promote the common interest to achieve a world
order based on fundamental principles of human dignity. Id. at 34-36. Scholars and
policymakers regard their approach to decision-making as a rigorous one embedded in a
social context. Id.
41. Scholars disagree about the extent to which recognition is required to establish legal
personality, or if legal personality can indeed exist independently of recognition. If legal
personality can exist without recognition, recognition is transformed into a legal duty
possessed by the state. See PETER H.F. BEKKER, THE LEGAL POSITION OF
INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 74 (1994).
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The term "sovereignty," by itself, gives us no clues as to its
creation, how it is maintained, its changing character, or indeed how it
is terminated." Contextual mapping may provide a useful bridge
between the different disciplines and cultural contexts in which the
term is used, often abused, and certainly misunderstood. Our aim in
this Part has been to point the way to the application of contextual
mapping to this subject.
II. SOVEREIGNTY AND THE UN CHARTER
The Charter of the UN is an instrument by which members
both assert their sovereignty and limit their sovereignty. The Charter
is more than a formal constitution for the international community. It
is, from the point of view of contextual mapping, an outcome of the
world, social, and power processes. It was a reaction to World War
II-to the experience of total war and the Holocaust. As a
preventative measure, the Charter placed limits on its members'
sovereignty. Yet, paradoxically, membership in the UN is an
important means of asserting sovereignty. An examination of the
history and text of the Charter reveals this tension.
The Charter was written for the sovereign nation-States of the
world community. Many of those sovereigns had been members of
the UN's predecessor, the League of Nations. The Charter also
inherited a sizable body of international law that preceded its entry
into force. One of the principles it inherited was that articulated in the
Lotus case: 43 that restrictions upon the sovereignty of States could not
be presumed. This suggested, in writing the Charter nearly twenty
years later, that some deference would have to be given to the
expectation that there are no presumptive limitations to sovereignty in
the international legal system. It should also be noted that the failure
of the League of Nations was rooted in the principle that any
individual sovereign State could exercise a veto in the League. The
UN Charter, in effect, would have to respond to these and other
42. The technique of contextual mapping provides indicators that locate sovereignty
within the interpenetrating regional, national, and global constitutive processes. The
mapping technique permits an inquiring scholar to locate sovereignty within an appropriately
comprehensive social and power context and permits us to mark out areas of stability and
change the sovereign influence on global public order and civil society as a scholastic
agenda. The idea that sovereignty is a central element of whatever is meant by constitutional
law is neither new nor remarkable. The mapping technique seems to confirm this in a more
objective way. More importantly, however, the technique permits us to look behind the
Grundnorm realistically and dynamically.
43. See The Case of the S.S. Lotus, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10.
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problems in defining the scope of sovereignty and the force of
international obligation.
The Charter does not define sovereignty. The first words in
the Preamble of the Charter introduces the key terms: "We the
Peoples of the United Nations determined .... ,,4 The references to
"Peoples" and "Nations," when coupled with the term "determined,"
suggest that the peoples of the world are the ultimate source of
international authority. Moreover, the peoples have "determined," or
made an affirmative decision, to adopt the Charter of the UN because
of certain problems and conditions of global salience.45 The member
States of the UN are sovereign; the idea that sovereign legitimacy and
authority under the Charter is derived from the "Peoples"46 ultimately
assumes that in the international community, sovereign national
authority is itself in some degree constrained by the authority of the
people it seeks to symbolize or represent.47 In short, the tacit
assumption of the authority of sovereignty is actually rooted in the
perspectives of all peoples in the global community who are not
objects of sovereignty but subjects of it. The demands of the
"Peoples" are expressed in four fundamental principles on which the
UN is premised: prevention of war,48 protection of human rights,4 9
respect for social progress according to the rule of law,5" and higher5
living standards and development for all. 2
44. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
45. The promulgation of the UN Charter in 1945 created an unambiguous, globally
codified constitution that is "not merely a treaty... [but rather] the constitutive instrument of
a living global organization." See Thomas M. Franck & Faiza Patel, UN Police Action in
Lieu of War: "The Old Order Changeth, " 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 63, 66-67 (1991).
46. U.N. CHARTER pmbl.
47. Article 1 of the Charter even provides that "[t]he Purposes of the United Nations
are... [t]o maintain international peace and security, and... to develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of
peoples." See id. art. 1. This statement of purpose safeguards the rights of the individual,
because the Charter tacitly recognizes that the responsibility of maintaining international
peace and security falls squarely on the shoulders of individuals.
48. See id. pmbl. (proclaiming the United Nations' pledge "to maintain international
peace and security, and ... to ensure... that armed force shall not be used, save in the
common interest").
49. See id. (proclaiming the United Nations' goal of reaffirming "faith in fundamental
human rights [and] the dignity and worth of the human person").
50. See id. (proclaiming the United Nations' pledge to "promote social progress").
51. See id. (proclaiming the United Nations' pledge to respect "the equal rights of men
and women and of nations large and small").
52. These principles were based on Roosevelt's four freedoms: freedom from fear,
freedom from want, freedom of expression, and freedom of conscience and belief, all of
which constituted the war aims of the Allies. See Franklin D. Roosevelt, Four Freedoms
Speech (January 6, 1941), in THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D.
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The concepts of "United" and "Nations" must be understood
conjunctively. When read together, these terms seem to generate
conflicts about the nature of sovereignty. One such conflict is
evident: the key operative components of the UN are sovereign
nations. 3 Accordingly, the efficacy of the UN should be measurable
by examining the sum of its parts. It is a body of coordinate
sovereigns; its institutional authority cannot aspire to more authority
than that reposing in the will of the sovereigns themselves. Yet, on
some occasions, the UN has the authority to invoke an institutional
capacity broader than the sum of its sovereign parts. In short, there is
tension in the international constitutional system based on principles
of international concern and obligation on the one hand and
sovereign, territorial, and political independence on the other.
The Preamble and Article 1 of the Charter spell out the scope
of international concern and the limitations on sovereignty. 4 Article
2 gives us a different structure of the division of competence and
concern. For example, Article 2(1) states that the UN is "based on the
principle of sovereign equality of all its Members."55 Article 2(7)
comes closest to defining sovereignty by indicating that the UN is not
authorized to intervene "in matters which are essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of any state."56 This Article could also be read
in light of Article 2(4), which prohibits the threat or use of force to
attack the "territorial integrity or political independence of any
state. 57  Among the specific restrictions on State sovereignty in
Article 2 is that States are subject to a good faith obligation to honor
Charter values and are required to settle disputes by peaceful
methods. 8
A further criterion that strengthens the principle that the UN
Charter is a sovereignty-dominating instrument is found in the
membership provisions of Chapter II. Article 3 states that the original
ROOSEVELT 663 (Facts-on-File, Inc. ed., 1995).
53. Oppenheim asserts that the phrase "sovereign nation" entails two kinds of
sovereignty possessed by each State: dominum, or territorial sovereignty, which is supreme
authority over all persons, items, and acts within that state's territory, and imperium, or
personal sovereignty, which is supreme authority over all citizens of that State, be they at
home or abroad. See 1 OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 123 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed.
1955).
54. U.N. CHARTER pmbl., art. 1.
55. Id. art. 2(1).
56. Id. art. 2(7).
57. Jd. art. 2(4).
58. Id. arts. 1(2), 1(3).
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members of the UN "shall be ... states,"59 and Article 4(1) states that
membership in the UN is open to "all other peace-loving states which
accept the obligations contained in the present Charter."60 Although
membership in the UN is exclusively a matter of State sovereignty, an
institutional set of limits is imposed: the State must be "peace-
loving" and accept all Charter obligations and accept the obligations
of international law as developed under the Charter. Likewise,
Article 6, though it may be exercised only in highly unusual or
exceptional circumstances, stipulates that a State may be expelled
from the UN if it is a persistent violator of the UN Charter.6' The
scope of prohibited activity that results in expulsion may be
controvertible. For example, expulsion can entail the loss of
recognition. Perhaps it might also impose a duty not to recognize an
expelled entity, or its acts, in the context of international relations and
law. Whether such a procedure may be pushed to the limit of regime
replacement may be hotly disputed, but at least in theory the question
of expulsion under Article 6 implicates the idea that the sovereign
equality of States is conditioned by UN Charter obligations and that a
persistent violation of these obligations erodes the authority of the
State. In short, the Charter supports and seeks to protect and advance
a particular form of good governance-oriented sovereignty. It also
aims to discourage other forms of government that seek to position
sovereignty above Charter obligations.
There are, of course, other Charter based limits on
sovereignty. For example, Chapter IV of the Charter outlines the
composition and workings of the General Assembly and gives the
Assembly the power to highlight any issue by making it a matter for
international discussion and elaboration. Specifically, Article 10
states that "[t]he General Assembly may discuss any questions or any
matters within the scope of the ... Charter., 62  In addition, the
Assembly has the power to initiate studies and make
recommendations. 63 This "promotional" Assembly function may
shape international expectations. Assembly recommendations may
even create soft international law that might be binding on sovereign
States in limited circumstances. 64
59. Id. art. 3.
60. Id. art. 4(1).
61. Id. art. 6.
62. Id. art. 10.
63. Id. art. 13.
64. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has advanced the notion that each UN
General Assembly Resolution is a form of soft law that in itself gradually becomes a binding
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The powers of the UN Security Council confer special
security-related competences upon certain member States. The five
permanent members exercise what some scholars deem to be super
sovereign powers.65 The five permanent members have the special
power of the veto in the Council.66 Other elected members have extra
powers by virtue of membership in the Council, but do not have
unilateral veto power. The importance of these powers cannot be
gainsaid. The Security Council is given the primary global
responsibility for peace and security67 and has the competence to
enforce its decisions peacefully (Chapter VI) or by the use of force
(Chapter VII).68 It has the authority to make the determination as to
whether there exists "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or
act of aggression."69
The powers of the Security Council, even when supported by
the five permanent members, are nevertheless subject to certain
inherent powers of sovereign States. Article 51 of the Charter assures
to members "the inherent right of ... self-defense ... until the
Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain
international peace and security."7°  The term "inherent" is
ambiguous.71 It seems to make reference to the notion that Article 51
form of law. The ICJ asserted in the Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion that "General
Assembly resolutions.. .provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or
the emergence of opinio juris .... [A] series of [General Assembly] resolutions may show
the gradual evolution of opinio juris required for the establishment of a new rule." See
Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 254-
55 (July 8). Oscar Schachter argues that a unanimous assertion in good faith by all-or at
least nearly all-states manifests opinio juris communis (instant custom) and thus, "[I]f
nearly all States agreed on what is the law, was there a sufficient reason to deny effect to that
determination?" See Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 114, 116 (Barry E. Carter & Phillip R. Trimble eds., 1991).
65. See LELAND M. GOODRICH ET AL., CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 290-309 (3d
ed. 1969) (discussing the history of UN Charter and offering justifications as to why the
Security Council is imbued with such power).
66. U.N. CHARTER art. 27(3).
67. Id. arts. 24, 41,42.
68. Id. art. 42.
69. Id. art. 39.
70. Id. art. 51.
71. The International Court of Justice has not interpreted the term "inherent" as used in
Article 51 regarding a State's right to self-defense. Accordingly, it could be interpreted using
one or more of the following seven methods: (1) summary, (2) literal, (3) systematic, (4)
logical, (5) historical, (6) functional, and (7) authoritative. The summary approach relies on
an intuitive understanding of what is a "natural" or an "ordinary" meaning. The literal
approach emphasizes the meaning of words in isolation and in the syntax of the sentence to
which they belong, while the systematic approach attaches significance to the meaning of
words in the wider context of the treaty as a whole. The objective of the logical approach is
to eliminate self-contradictions, inconsistencies and absurdities by conclusive reasoning. In
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itself codifies this "inherent" right. At the same time "inherent" may
refer to rights which are not clearly articulated in Article 51 but
instead existed antecedent to the Charter. It is one of the most
contested provisions in the entire Charter and possibly in all of
international law.72
What is clear is that the Charter represents a continuing
constitutional process of conflict and collaboration with respect to the
basic architecture of international law and international relations. The
contestation sometimes reflects a strong Lotus version of sovereignty,
thus seeking to weaken the scope of international obligation. At other
times, it is the strength of the international obligation supported by the
critical powers within the UN that seems to weaken the scope of
sovereignty under the Charter. The classic tension, therefore,
between what counts as a matter of international concern under the
Charter and what is exclusively reserved to the domestic jurisdiction
of a State generates controversies in the actual practice of
international law and international relations. When we examine the
UN Charter as a process of communication and collaboration-as a
continuing process of working through and refining precise
allocations of competence in the international system-we find that it
is like a work of art still in progress. The scope of international
obligation and domestic sovereign competence is and will remain
controverted. The rights of peoples within the constitutional system,
with its undefined boundaries of authority, will consistently challenge
the institutional foundations of the UN system itself.
the historical approach, the meaning of the text is clarified by reference to the drafting
history. The functional (or teleological) approach considers the functions that a particular
clause or treaty as a whole is intended to fulfill in regulating the legal relations between the
parties. Finally, the authoritative approach calls for the joint interpretation of a legal
document by the parties. See GEORGE SCIIWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 153-54 (4th ed. 1960).
72. For example, assume that State A has stockpiled weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) and that the relations between State A and B are and have been conflict-prone. Can
State B consider the stockpiling of WMD to be a "threat" sufficient to provoke an
anticipatory level of self-defense under Article 51? Since the use of force, even in defense,
may implicate thejus in bello and general human rights standards, what are we to make in
retrospect of the problem of nuclear weapons deployments and the theory of deterrence based
on mutually assured destruction? The weapons that cannot be constrained by either
principles of necessity or proportionality or humanitarianism challenge the concept of
sovereignty to the extent that the use of force may be without limit or restraint. Thus, the
lawfulness of the threat or use of force using nuclear weapons was given a careful juridical
appraisal in the ICJ advisory opinion on this issue. A majority of the Court held that nuclear
weapons might be used consistently with Article 51 only where the "survival" of the state
was at stake under the prevailing state of international law conditions. See generally
Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July
8).
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III. SOVEREIGNTY AND UNIVERSALIZING
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
One of the most important outcomes of World War II was the
general acceptance of the principle that States that act as aggressors
abuse their sovereignty, and their leaders may be accountable directly
to the international community. The establishment of this principle
marked a revolutionary change in the scope of sovereignty. This was
a major change in the international constitutional system, not only by
limiting sovereignty, but also by making individual State officials
directly accountable, thus creating the principle that individuals have
rights and obligations directly under international law. To date, these
changes in the concept of sovereignty have been most strongly
embodied in the Rome Statute, the founding document of the
International Criminal Court (ICC). From one angle it can be said
that the Rome Statute represents a reduction of state sovereignty in
order to promote individual human rights. We argue, however, for
viewing the Rome Statute from another perspective, one from which
it appears that the ICC is an instrument for promoting sovereignty.
We begin with historical background on the founding of the
ICC. The post-World War II limitations on sovereignty and State
absolutism covered such concerns as those identified with jus ad
bellum, jus in bello and the principles of humanitarianism. The
Nuremberg Charter and subsequent trials provided a serious limitation
on the absolutist idea of sovereignty. Nazi absolutism could not
provide a defense for Nazi leaders responsible for war crimes. The
ascription of individual responsibility for war crimes also created
another critical innovation in international law. The individual could
assert civil and political rights-human rights--directly under
international law. The Nuremberg process and the growth of human
rights changed the concept, if not the foundations, of sovereignty
under the Charter system. Moreover, it is currently asserted that
States as sovereigns have no competence to commit acts of
aggression, to transgress the Geneva Conventions and its Protocols, or
to violate basic fundamental human rights. As previously mentioned,
the Nuremberg Tribunal implied that States and sovereigns are
abstractions and can best be held responsible if it is recognized that
behind the State and the sovereign is the actual, finite State group of
officials. Some of these officials were held to account directly under
international law; they were tried, convicted, and executed.73 The
73. The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was authorized to impose "death
or such other punishment as shall be determined by it to be just" upon an individual
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implications of this idea are problematic for the post-World War II
State system.
Nuremberg established the principle that State officials could
be tried for criminal offenses under international law. They could be
apprehended according to the principle of universal jurisdiction and
tried for territorial and extra-territorial offenses against international
law; ultimately, they were convicted and executed. The end of the
Cold War and the occurrences of ethnic conflict, accompanied by
mass murder and heinous violations of basic human rights and
humanitarian precepts, gave rise to a renewed interest in the necessity
of holding State and quasi-State officials accountable. Public opinion
left the world community no option but to create two ad hoc tribunals
for trying individuals who committed heinous crimes against
international law in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. A renewed
and purposeful interest was spearheaded to create an International
Criminal Court and the Rome Statute entered into force on July 1,
2002. 7" This development was mainly inspired by a new international
alignment of progressive States; the so-called "like-minded" group of
States actors.75 Superpower support for these developments remained
lukewarm or, in some instances, hostile. 76 At the same time, smaller
States that had much to gain from a working international rule of law
concept-including the protections of their political independence
and territorial sovereignty given by law-began exercising
jurisdiction within their domestic legal processes over criminal
conduct by foreign leaders deemed to be subject to universal
jurisdiction.
convicted of crimes against humanity. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 27, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 300.
Specifically, in the trial of the major war criminals, seven of the accused were sentenced to
extended prison terms, eleven were sentenced to death by hanging, and three were acquitted.
See JOSEPH E. PERSICO, NUREMBERG: INFAMY ON TRIAL 397-405 (1994).
74. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome Statute on the International Criminal Court, July 17,
1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF/183/9, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome
Statute].
75. See Kofi Annan, UN-Secretary General Urges "Like-Minded" States to Ratify the
Statute of the International Criminal Court, M2 PRESSWIRE, Sept. 2, 1998 (calling for the
global community to sign the Rome Statute of the International Court of Justice).
76. See Joseph Lelyveld, The Defendant, THE NEW YORKER, May 27, 2002, at 87 ("The
total of sixty-six ratifying nations included America's closest allies... [but the] holdouts
include Russia, China, and the 'axis of evil:' Iran, Iraq, and North Korea."). The Congress
of the United States has indicated its distaste for the International Criminal Court in proposed
acts of legislation, such as the American Servicemember and Citizen Protection Act of 2002,
H.R. 4169, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (2002). See generally JENNIFER ELSEA, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, U.S. POLICY REGARDING THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2002).
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Spain issued an indictment against Pinochet and asked the
United Kingdom to apprehend and extradite him to Spain to stand
trial there for violations of international criminal law.77 The House of
Lords ruled that he was extraditable, and it was only because of a
finding of ill health that the Home Secretary chose not to extradite
Pinochet. Other States such as Belgium78 have already tried a case79
and issued arrest warrants for foreign governmental officials on the
basis that there is cause to believe that they have committed
international crimes sufficient to activate universal jurisdiction.
Specifically, Belgium issued arrest warrants against an African
Foreign Minister8" and the current Prime Minister of Israel.8
In the case of the African Foreign Minister, the World Court
ruled that the arrest warrant could not be issued against the official
since he was protected at the time by the principle of sovereign
77. The notion of universal jurisdiction exercised by an individual state or sovereign is
deeply rooted in British practice of the Nineteenth Century. Acts of piracy violated the law
of nations. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 1 at 505. The rules relating to the prohibition of
slavery and piracy were considered to be rules of universal prescriptive force. In other
words, every nation had the right to punish the perpetrators, regardless of where and against
whom the acts were committed. See HENRY WHEATON, ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
176 (3d ed. 1846). It should be noted that even at this point in history, judges and jurists
carefully drew a distinction between universally prohibited acts of piracy on the high seas
and acts prohibited by domestic municipal laws of any given State. See OPPENHEIM, supra
note 1, at 506. James Brierly, the British publicist, justified this early version of universal
jurisdiction when he wrote that in cases of piracy, offending ships were regarded as stateless
entities. By virtue of the offenders' commission of acts of piracy, they effectively forfeited
any protection afforded by their national flags. See J. L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS
306-07 (Sir Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963). The enforcement of these rules was left
to the institutions and practices of individual states. See id. Great Britain outlawed slavery in
all of its territories in 1833 and used its political, diplomatic, and military competence to
enforce these international law rules of universal import. The importance of British historical
practice seems to have escaped the attention of the learned Law Lords.
78. In 1999, the Belgian legislature amended a 1993 law (specifically, the Law of 16
June 1993, 2 Codes Belge (Bruylant), at 240/5 (62d Supp. 1996)), giving its national courts
jurisdiction to try offenses arising under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols I and II regardless of where they were committed. This amendment effectively
gave Belgian courts jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and genocidal acts. See Loi
Relative a la Repression des Violations Graves de Droit International Humanitaire, Art. 3
A-B (1999), in MONITEUR BELGE, Mar. 23, 1999.
79. Belgium forcefully pursues individuals it regards as perpetrators of crimes against
humanity. See Special Report: Judging Genocide, THE ECONOMIST, June 16, 2001, at 23-24
(discussing a Belgian jury's 2001 decision to convict Sisters Gertrude and Maria Kisito, two
Catholic nuns, for their involvement in the commission of genocidal acts in Rwanda).
80. In April 2000, Belgium issued an international arrest warrant for then Foreign
Minister of the Republic of the Congo, Abdulaye Yerodia Ndombasi. The Democratic
Republic of the Congo contested this arrest warrant. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000
(Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. BeIg.), 2002 I.C.J. 3 (Feb. 14).
81. See Tom Miles, Sharon faces war crimes trial once out of office, INDEPENDENT,
(London), Feb. 13, 2003, at P12 (reporting that Belgium's highest court ruled that after Israeli
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon leaves office, he can be prosecuted for war crimes).
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immunity.82 In Arusha, the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) convicted a Rwandan bourgmestre-a position akin
to being mayor of a city-on an indictment based partially upon the
crime of genocide.83 It is indeed remarkable that such an historic
precedent took place in Africa. In Europe, the ICTY is currently
trying Slobodan Milosevic,14 and a general has already been convicted
for crimes against humanity." The legal basis for these developments
is built on the principle of universal jurisdiction. It is obvious that this
precept challenges the principle of unlimited sovereignty, or in
international constitutional terms, the reach of internal "domestic
jurisdiction" under Article 2(7) of the UN Charter.8 6
The scope or ambit of the assertions of universal jurisdiction
gave the ad hoc tribunals the "power to prosecute persons responsible
for serious violations of international humanitarian law., 8 7 The term
"humanitarian law" included grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949,88 violations of the laws and customs of war,8 9
genocide,9° and crimes against humanity.9' The importance of the
82. See Arrest Warrant, supra note 80, at 29-30. The Court stressed that immunity
from prosecution does not exonerate the individual from criminal responsibility, but only
delays the ability to prosecute him until he no longer has official duties to perform on behalf
of the State. Id. at 25-26.
83. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998),
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1399 (1998).
84. See Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-99-37, Initial Indictment (May 24, 1999),
available at http://www.un.org/icty/indictment/english/mil-ii990524e.htm.
85. Trial Chamber convicted Lieutenant-General Radislav Krstic of genocide for the
July 1995 massacre of more than 7000 male Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica and sentenced
him to forty-six years imprisonment. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment,
para. 726 (Aug. 2, 2001). The Tribunal declared that the events in Srebrenica "defy
description in their horror and their implications for humankind's capacity to revert to acts of
brutality under the stresses of conflict." Id. para. 2. In 2004, Trial Chamber set aside
Krstic's genocide conviction on appeal. Trial Chamber acknowledged that it did not identify
individual members of the Armed Forces of the Republika Srpska Main Staff as the principal
participants in the genocide at issue, which Trial Chamber stressed "[did] not negate the
finding that Radislav Krstic was aware of their genocidal intent." Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case
No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment, para. 143 (April 19, 2004). Accordingly, Trial Chamber entered
a conviction of Krstic for aiding and abetting genocide and sentenced him to thirty-five years
imprisonment. Id. para. 275.
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
87. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, art. 1,
contained in the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of S.C. Res. 808,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993), reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1170
(1993).
88. Id. art. 2.
89. Id. art. 3.
90. Id. art. 4.
91. Id. art. 5. Acts qualifying as crimes against humanity under the Yugoslavian Statute
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creation and effective functioning of the ad hoc tribunals seemed to
pave the way for a renewed and sustained effort to create an
International Criminal Court for the most serious violations of
international criminal law.
The Preamble of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court affirms that the "most serious crimes" are of "concern
to the international community and must not go unpunished."92 The
Preamble also indicates that the international community is
determined to put an end to impunity. Article 1 of the Rome Statute
establishes the International Criminal Court and stipulates that it shall
be a "permanent institution and shall have the power to exercise itsjurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international
concern."93 Article 27 makes explicit that the statute applies to high-
level governmental officials such as the head of State or the head of
government, as well as governmental officials or elected politicians.94
None are "exempt from criminal responsibility."95  Article 27(2)
makes explicit that immunities or special procedural rules will not
shield the court from exercising its jurisdiction.96 The standard that
delineates the kinds of acts considered to be international crimes that
fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC is wider than the standards
articulated by the Nuremberg Tribunal and those of both the ad hoc
Tribunals for Rwanda and the Former Yugoslavia.97 Nuremberg did
not include the crime of genocide within its jurisdiction since there
was no such international crime in 1945. The ad hoc tribunals'
statutes omitted the crime of aggression. How do these developments
affect the concept of State sovereignty as conventionally understood?
A general concern is that the idea of universal jurisdiction
itself is simply incompatible with a system of international law and
international relations based on sovereign States. The idea of the
sovereign State can be characterized by its inherent realism because it
is a repository of real power in the international system. It likewise
exercises a near monopoly on domestic lawmaking power. As a
result of the problem of real power, which links the sovereign to
are similar to those delineated in the Nuremburg Charter, such as: extermination, murder,
torture, enslavement, deportation, rape, imprisonment, political/racial/religious persecutions,
and other inhumane acts. Id.
92. Rome Statute, supra note 74, pmbl.
93. Id. art. 1.
94. Id. art. 27.
95. Id. art. 27(1).
96. Id. art. 27(2).
97. These are genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of
aggression.
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lawmaking, it seems that the bases of claims to universal jurisdiction
would be weak and highly problematic in theory and practice. We
would submit, however, that there is another way to analyze the
ostensible conflict between sovereignty and the claim to universal
jurisdiction in international law.
In contemporary international law, sovereignty does not draw
its essential validity exclusively from the barrel of the gun. It does
not draw its vitality from the older, perhaps arcane idea of State
absolutism. Sovereignty is not a top-down matter. It draws both its
power and its essential legitimacy from the bottom-from the people.
Because sovereignty has such a close affinity with effective power, it
is like all frameworks of power relations: it is always contested
whether the contestation happens in a democracy or some other form
of sovereign governance. The central problem behind the crimes
prosecuted in the Rome Statute is that these are crimes essentially
against the people, or against the sovereignty established by the
people. Indeed, the Rome Statute's enumeration of crimes is
designed to protect sovereignty, which is understood to be rooted in
the will of the people. In other words, universal jurisdiction, in its
conceptual and normative design, is an instrument for the protection
of sovereignty, which is based on the human and humanitarian rights
of people.
One of the most important clarifications of the nature of
sovereignty under the UN Charter is in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. According to Article 16, "[e]veryone shall
have the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the
law."98 Article 18 specifies the people's right to freedom of thought.99
Article 19 stresses the people's "right to hold opinions without
interference" and that the people "shall have the freedom of
expression."' 0 Article 25 stresses the right to participate in the
political welfare of the State, the universal right to vote, and the right
to have access to public service.' Perhaps the most significant
change wrought by the UN Charter and subsequent practice is that the
idea of sovereignty as identified with State absolutism has been
incrementally changed by rooting its conceptual basis not only in the
monopoly of effective power, but that the power of sovereignty is
98. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp (No. 16), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR].
99. Id. art. 18.
100. Id. art. 19.
101. Id.art.25.
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normatively based on a predicate of authority and legitimacy, which
is rooted in the people's expectations.
The Declaration on the "Guidelines of the Recognition of New
States in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union" made recognition
subject to strong normative standards of international justice.1"2 The
Guidelines include "respect for the provisions of the Charter of the
UN and the commitments subscribed to in the Final Act of Helsinki
and in the Charter of Paris, especially with regard to the rule of law,
democracy and human rights."'0 3  The Summit of the Americas:
Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action articulated that
democracy is "the sole political system which guarantees respect for
human rights and the rule of law.""
The 1991 Charter of Paris is another crucial expectation-
creating instrument that roots "sovereignty" in the popular will of the
people.'°5 Respect for human rights and the rule of law is an essential
safeguard against what this Charter calls "an over-mighty State. '0 6
Democracy, it declares, is "based on the will of the people" and "has
as its foundation respect of the human person and the rule of law."' 10 7
These illustrations and many others are an indication that fundamental
expectations of the nature of the State, including its basic institutions
of governance and it sovereignty, are being conditioned by what
distinguished scholars have called a right to democratic
governance.'0 8 The idea is that the formal historic requirements for
the de facto recognition of a State (e.g. territory, population, internal
governance, foreign relations)0 9 have been supplemented by the
normative constraints and demands of critical symbols of authority
associated or identified with the human right to democratic
governance. These demands, which are often rooted in the aspirations
102. See Declaration on the "Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern
Europe and in the Soviet Union," Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1485 (1992).
103. Id. at 1487.
104. Summit of the Americas: Declaration of Principles and Plan of Actions, Dec. 11,
1994, 34 I.L.M. 808, 810 (1995).
105. See Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 21 1990, 30 I.L.M. 193, 193 (1991).
106. Id. at 193-94.
107. Id.
108. Professor Thomas Franck suggests that there exists a right to be governed by
representative democracy, and that international law permits enforcement of this right, by or
through the Security Council. See generally Thomas Franck, The Emerging Right to
Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
109. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 201 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT] (defining a state as "an entity that has a
defined territory and a permanent population, under the control of its own government, and
that engages in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such entities").
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of the "people," include laws reflecting transparency, responsibility,
and accountability, and a commitment that the Rule of Law-in its
widest sense-must be an intrinsic component of the nature, scope,
and practical functions of sovereignty.
Returning to the issue of universal jurisdiction and the Rome
Statute, we suggest that the values sought by the Statute manifest the
idea that sovereignty is rooted in the authority and expectations of the
people. For example, the Statute makes the crime of aggression
subject to its jurisdictional, and, in the process, prosecutorial reach. "0
One of the most important sovereignty-securing themes in the Statute
is that the international system seeks to protect sovereignty by
outlawing crimes against the peace and acts of aggression that target
the territorial integrity and political independence of the sovereign
State. Since weak, small, or mid-sized sovereign States may be
vulnerable to aggression, the value of the legal rules that proscribe
aggression and seek to ensure criminal punishment for those who
perpetrate them is meant to strengthen the sovereignty of the State
and safeguard the security of the people, who, again, are the basis of
authority of State sovereignty."'
IV. AFRICAN SOVEREIGNTY AND WORLD ORDER
The concept of sovereignty has played a crucial role in the
experiences of Africa. States that have evolved from colonial rule
have been particularly sensitive about their sovereignty and about the
principles of non-intervention. This strong version of sovereignty is
very much a part of African political development. Historically,
African sovereignty was a critical aspiration for a continent
subordinated to imperial and colonial interests. African political
leaders agitated, and in some cases fought, for freedom from alien
rule and colonial sovereignty." 2 The claim to freedom from alien rule
110. See Rome Statute, supra note 74, art. 5.
111. Previous exercises of universal jurisdiction as a response to acts of genocide
illustrate that mass extermination of people-the primary body of authority in non-
totalitarian sovereign States-is criminal. They also show that mass murder constitutes an
attack on the authoritative foundations of a State. Accordingly, it might be possible to
construe war crimes and crimes against humanity similarly. We submit that since the
conceptual and normative bases of national sovereignty have shifted the root of state
authority to the people, the developments in international law regarding human rights and
humanitarian law shall give increasingly critical normative guidance to sovereignty. It is,
after all, based on popular will and supported by the Rule of Law.
112. One of the most celebrated examples of this in history is the Republic of South
Africa. See S. AFR. CONST. pmbl. (1996) (stating the national objective of building "a united
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was based on the idea that alien sovereignty could not maintain the
imprimatur of popular sovereignty-an idea tied to claims for self-
determination and independence.
A contemporary example is provided by Eritrea, which only
recently became a new, sovereign State.11 3 Eritrea successfully fought
a war of national liberation for Eritrean sovereignty from the former
Ethiopian Empire. Ethiopian-Eritrean arbitration was obliged to give
practical meaning to the territorial aspect of sovereignty in the effort
to precisely define Eritrea's borders, maritime possessions, titles, and
ensure that its territorial integrity and security are protected under
international law. 14
Because of the African emphasis on a strong, pre-World War
II version of sovereignty, the Organization of African Unity (OAU)
developed a markedly modest institutional capacity to forge
distinctively African concepts of continental legal obligation as
limitations on African sovereignty.115  Correspondingly, African
and democratic South Africa able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of
nations").
113. Ethiopia is one of Africa's most ancient civilizations. Throughout the last one
hundred years, it has brought various nationalities, including the Eritreans, under the imperial
rule of a fundamentally feudalist Amharic Ethiopian ruling class. See Peter A. Nyong'o, The
Implications of Crises and Conflict in the Upper Nile Valley, in CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN
AFRICA 95, 97-98 (Francis M. Deng & 1. William Zartman eds., 1991). In the late
Nineteenth Century, Ethiopia was colonized by the Italians. Concurrently, from the late
1880s to 1941, Eritrea was colonized and controlled by Italy. The Treaty of Wuchale was
executed between Italy and Ethiopia in 1889 to establish the still-existing geographic borders
of Eritrea, which functioned as a concession to Italy in return for Italy's pledge to refrain
from colonizing other Ethiopian regions. See DAYLE E. SPENCER & WILLIAM J. SPENCER,
THE INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION NETWORK: A NEW METHOD OF APPROACHING SOME
VERY OLD PROBLEMS 11-12 (1992). A result of the cultural, political, and economic
predominance of the Amharans was Eritrea's compelling claim to self-determination. The
Provisional Government of Eritrea was established by the Eritrean People's Liberation Front
(EPLF) on May 29, 1991, after the EPLF defeated Ethiopian forces of the former Mengistu
regime and achieved control of Asmara, the provincial capital. See Jane Perlez, Talks on a
New Ethiopia Affirm Right to Secede, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 199 1, at A4.
114. See First Stage, Territorial Sovereignty and Scope of the Dispute (Eri. v. Yemen),
paras. 451-52 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1998), reprinted in 40 I.L.M. 900 (2001). For information
regarding the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, see generally Eritrea-Ethiopia
Boundary Commission: Decision on Delimitation rendered Apr. 13, 2002, available at
http://www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/EY%20Phase%201.PDF.
115. Before World War II, especially during the Nineteenth Century, a sense of African
solidarity emerged among African-American intellectuals, which slowly spread to the
African continent. See OWEN CHARLES MATHURIN, HENRY SYLVESTER WILLIAMS AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE PAN-AFRICAN MOVEMENT 1869-1911, 52, 55 (1976). Eventually, this
emergent sense of solidarity became a socio-political movement in the Pan-African struggle
against racial discrimination. See ELENGA M'BUYINGA, PAN AFRICANISM OR NEO-
COLONIALISM?: THE BANKRUPTCY OF THE O.A.U. 34-42 (Michael Pallis trans., 2d ed. 1982)
(1979). The Pan-African movement persisted even after World War II as a mechanism by
which Africans fought for independence from colonialism in Africa. See RONALD W.
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human rights have had a weak framework of intergovernmental
support as well. This situation may well change.
A new African conception of sovereignty is being formulated
in terms of continent-wide obligations, thereby subordinating African
sovereignty to the continent's own constitutional and public order
priorities and values. This is a reformulation of sovereignty that, for
want of a more apt expression, we might call "cooperative
sovereignty.""' 6  The reformulation of the doctrine in these terms
would entail recognition of the common interest of African
governance in strengthening state and society through principles of
cooperation in the common interests of peace, human rights, and
development on a continent-wide basis. One might analogize the
constitution of the OAU as having evolved into a constitutional
scheme that approximates sovereignty in the League of Nations
system. It will be recalled that under the League, the strong,
unilateral doctrine of sovereignty came at the expense of a
recognizable, political, and juridical obligation to secure the major
purposes and objectives of that institution.'17 It might similarly be
said that African unity in the OAU Charter was compromised, in
some degree, by the claims of some States to ignore or pay lip service
to the normative mandate of the OAU. 1"8 When we explore the
evolution of the African Union (AU), we see a greater political and
juridical insistence on the principle of cooperative sovereignty as a
cornerstone of a new form of continental governance in Africa.
In Africa we can observe clusters of States in formal and
informal alignments in North Africa, West Africa, East Central
Africa, and Southern Africa. The Southern African Development
Community (SADC), for example, has pursued an agenda of common
interests based on economic development and integration of the
region as a whole." 9 Economic integration sometimes serves as a
WALTERS, PAN AFRICANISM IN THE AFRICAN DIASPORA: AN ANALYSIS OF MODERN
AFROCENTRIC POLITICAL MOVEMENTS 139-45 (1993).
116. For some uses of this principle, see Winston P. Nagan, Strengthening Humanitarian
Law: Sovereignty, International Criminal Law and the Ad Hoc Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 6 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 127, 132-33 (1995); see also FRANZ XAVER PERREZ,
COOPERATIVE SOVEREIGNTY: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO INTERDEPENDENCE IN THE STRUCTURE
OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (2000). See generally Winston Nagan,
International Intellectual Property, Access to Healthcare, and Human Rights: South Africa
v. United States, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 155 (2002).
117. See generally FRANK P. WALTERS, A HISTORY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1952);
ALFRED E. ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW (1936).
118. See generally Colin Legum, The Organisation of African Unity-Success or
Failure?, 51 INT'L AFF. 208 (1975).
119. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) was established in 1992
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basis for broader patterns of political and cultural integration. Indeed,
it is sometimes the case that economic choices are so politically
limiting that they almost become apolitical; some permit agreements,
understandings, and alliances that are generally impossible if the
economic tail is wagging the political dog. Yet, once these
understandings become, in some degree, institutionalized
expectations, they can influence and stimulate broader patterns of
political and cultural collaboration in the common interest.
Frequently, these regional alignments reflect regional issues, such as
trade and investment, but may be expanded to ultimately include
security, health, education, labor, population migration, and more.
The critical component of African sovereignty, security, and
development is the still-elusive framework or process that might give
the phrase "African unity" a meaning. International jurists and
scholars are still searching for a system of continental African
governance that can facilitate local, regional, and state management to
stimulate development in which notions of peace and security are
inextricably entrenched. In other words, the objective is an African
sovereignty that furthers a single political, economic, and cultural
agenda that makes equity and fairness practical expectations. It
would therefore seem that the concept of governance, which is deeply
rooted in sovereign state processes, must transcend them to include
regional interests and objectives. It must further secure a dynamic
role for a continent-wide form of constitutional governance that
strengthens the interests of both the sovereign States of which this
governance is comprised and the people who comprise the States.
V. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THREATS AND
SOVEREIGNTY: THE TERRORISM PROBLEM
Contemporary threats to international peace and security in the
aftermath of 9/11 have generated concerns that powerful non-State
actors might find refuge behind State protectors that in turn invoke
the principle that sovereignty in international law bars intervention in
the sovereign domestic jurisdiction of a State. States targeted by
terrorist acts are reluctant to accept that their responses to such attacks
and replaced the Southern African Co-ordination Conference in order to advance cooperation
among member states (Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South
Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) and to support their economic growth
and development. See ROBERT RANGELEY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL RIVER BASIN
ORGANIZATIONS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 11-12 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 250,
1994).
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are constrained by principles of sovereignty in international law. In
response to this tension, the Bush administration has developed a
national security doctrine with important challenges to sovereignS
and to notions of self-defense, the use of force, and intervention. 0
The most controversial elements of the Bush doctrine are its claim to
legitimate preemptive intervention, the implicit notion that "rogue"
States may not invoke sovereignty to escape retribution, and the
advocacy of regime change.
In an international environment in which sovereign States may
invoke sovereignty to protect non-State groups not influenced by or
indifferent to the usual deterrents in the inter-sovereign State order,
there is an incentive to provide more precise typologies of State and
sovereignty. The UN Charter provides normative guidance by
making membership contingent on a State's commitment to honoring
the major purposes of the UN Charter. Among the criteria of
statehood and sovereignty in international law as earlier indicated are
the formal indicators of control: territory, population, governance and
foreign relations competence. 2' A critical notion of historic salience
was the idea that, since the sovereign is the ultimate lawmaker, the
sovereign is above the law and thus incapable of abusing its sovereign
powers. The newer idea of sovereignty is that it is incomplete
without an authority component rooted in the popular will. The new
Bush doctrine actually sees certain kinds of States as either terroristic
or rogue-like. This doctrine, however, requires a more precise
typology of States and sovereignty. Applying the idea that
sovereignty might be abused, we submit that there are at least twelve
types of States in the international system.'22 They are:
9 Failed State: a State that is "incapable of protecting
individuals" within its territory;'23
120. See generally White House, The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America (Sept. 17, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse. gov/nsc/nss.pdf.
121. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 109, § 201.
122. Philosophers, with prescriptive rather than descriptive aims in mind, have also
thought about the adequacy of the conceptions of states and have suggested more
discriminating typologies. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 4 (1999) (distinguishing
among five varieties of societies: liberal peoples, decent peoples, outlaw states, burdened
peoples and benevolent absolutisms).
123. See KAREN MUSALO, ET AL., REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 988 (1997) (defining a
failed state as one that is "incapable of protecting individuals within [its territory]."
Examples include Somalia, Bosnia, Cambodia, Mozambique, and Liberia. See generally
ASIL Meeting and Regional Activity: 1994 Annual Meeting to Examine the Transformation
of Sovereignty, ASIL NEWSLETTER, Sept. 1993 (delineating Somalia, Bosnia, and Cambodia
as "failed states"). Accordingly, the UN Security Council has sponsored comprehensive
projects in Somalia, Cambodia, and elsewhere to restore crumbling governmental and civil
structures. See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N.
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" Anarchic State: a State with no meaningful legal system; 1 4
" Genocidal State: a State that engages in a deliberate policy
of genocide;125
" Homicidal State: a State that engages in a deliberate policy
of repression and violence against its subjects; 12 6
" Rogue or Terrorist State: a State that sponsors terrorism;127
GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp No. 1, at 80-87, U.N. Doc. A/48/1 (1993). Regarding
Mozambique, see Barry Schutz, The Heritage of Revolution and the Struggle for
Governmental Legitimacy in Mozambique, in COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND
RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE AUTHORITY 109, 109-110 (I. William Zartman ed., 1993)
[hereinafter COLLAPSED STATES] (stating that Mozambique may lack infrastructural
legitimacy). Regarding Liberia, see Martin Lowenkopf, Liberia: Putting the State Back
Together, in COLLAPSED STATES, at 91, 91 (noting that Liberia is "fragmented, the population
dispersed, and the economy ruined").
124. Examples include Afghanistan and Zaire. After the end of the Afghan-Soviet War
in 1989, a struggle for power ensued in Afghanistan at the instigation of various individuals
in multiple clans, political parties, and militias, the result of which was that much of the State
descended into "complete anarchy." See Carla Power, When Women are the Enemy:
Afghanistan 's Taliban Fighters Have Taken the War Between the Sexes to a New Extreme,
NEWSWEEK, Aug. 3, 1998, at 37. Zaire (currently the Democratic Republic of Congo)
arguably qualified as an anarchic state. See John Darnton, Zaire Drifting into Anarchy as
Authority Disintegrates, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1994, at Al (reviewing the economic and
social dysfunction in the then-existing State of Zaire); see also S.C. Res. 1078, U.N. SCOR,
51st Sess., 3710th mtg. at 1-3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1078 (1996) (communicating the Security
Council's concern regarding the worsening humanitarian state of affairs in Eastern Zaire).
125. Examples include Nazi Germany, Rwanda, Burundi, Cambodia, and Stalinist
Russia. Regarding Stalinist Russia, Stalin commenced his extensive collectivization effort
beginning in 1929, a strategy he devised to collectivize farming by destroying the social class
of farmers-collectively referred to as "kulaks"-who owned property by divesting them of
this property. In reality, "kulak" was a loose term to describe anyone who opposed Stalin's
collectivization strategy from 1929 to 1953, and was thus used to describe huge numbers of
peasants as well as land-owning farmers. This collectivisation strategy was a thinly disguised
genocidal campaign in which approximately ten million Russians were murdered from 1929
to 1939. Millions more were imprisoned in labor camps in which many were worked to
death and millions more than that were purposefully allowed to starve to death. See
generally SHEILA FITZPATRICK, STALIN'S PEASANTS: RESISTANCE AND SURVIVAL IN THE
RUSSIAN VILLAGE AFTER COLLECTIVIZATION (1994); see also MARTIN SHAW, WAR
AND GENOCIDE: ORGANIZED KILLING IN MODERN SOCIETY 36 (2003).
126. Examples include Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Mao Zedong's People's Republic of
China, and Idi Amin's Uganda. Regarding Saddam Hussein's Iraq, see SAID K. ABURISH,
SADDAM HUSSEIN: THE POLITICS OF REVENGE 61 (2000). Criminal law under Chairman Mao
Zedong imposed the death penalty for "crimes of counterrevolution," or situations that in any
way jeopardize the sovereignty or security of China, as well as for offenses such as setting
fires, committing espionage, and bribing police officials, and sabotaging utility installations.
See Wang Minghy, Uphold Mao Zedong's People's Democratic Dictatorship-Style
Viewpoint on the Death Penalty as a Guide to Our Legislative and Judicial Practice on the
Death Penalty, in AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/ASIA, Vol. 6 No. 9,
Aug. 1994, at 19. Regarding Uganda, see ROBERT H. JACKSON & CARL G. ROSBERG,
PERSONAL RULE IN BLACK AFRICA 252-265 (1982) (documenting that from 1971 to 1979, Idi
Amin expelled the Asian community from Uganda and expropriated their property. During
his homicidal rule, Amin transformed Uganda into a "slaughter-house" by killing or bringing
about the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of Ugandans).
127. Afghanistan is an excellent example and was even among a series of countries
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" Drug-influenced State: a State in which drug cartels
exercise significant influence over the State or interfere with
the State's functions;128
" Organized crime-influenced State: a State in which criminal
organizations exercise significant influence over the State or
interfere with the State's functions;129
designated by the State Department as being of "particular concern" as state sponsors of
terrorism or, in recent years, as "rogue states." Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright
also designated Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria as state sponsors of
terrorism. See 31 C.F.R. 596.201 (2000). In his State of the Union Address of Tuesday,
January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush identified Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea as terrorist states that, with "their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil,
arming to threaten the peace of the world." See Press Release, White House, President
Delivers State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020129-11 .html. The United States additionally identified
Cuba, Libya, and Syria as nations it claims are deliberately seeking to obtain chemical or
biological weapons. See US Expands "'Axis of Evil", BBC NEWS, May 6, 2002, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/americas/1971852.stm.
128. Examples include Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and Colombia. The Taliban
regime was long a drug-influenced state and a source of significant international concern.
See S.C. Res. 1214, U.N. SCOR, 3952d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1214 (1998) (chronicling the
concern had by the UN General Assembly, which demanded that the Taliban regime stop
"the cultivation, production and trafficking [of illegal drugs]"). According to the Bureau for
International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs in the U.S. Department of State,
Afghanistan became the world's largest producer of opium poppy in
1999. Traffickers of Afghan heroin route most of their production to
Europe but also target North America .... [E]fforts at crop eradication,
drug supply reduction, counter narcotics law enforcement, and demand
reduction have completely failed. In fact, . . . the Taliban, who [along
with other factions] control 97% of the territory where poppy is grown,
promote poppy cultivation to finance their war machines.
See Bureau for Int'l Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State,
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999 (2000), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/nrcrpt/1999/923.htm. Indeed, the Taliban regime "[enjoyed]
significant financial benefits from a reported ten percent tax on opium transactions [in
Afghanistan]." See id Regarding Colombia, the drug trade has historically been a
significant element in the infrastructure of the State of Colombia, and the effects have been
felt worldwide. One reason was that the Medellin Cartel-run by Colombian drug lords-
has consistently produced most of the world's cocaine. See Bradley Graham, Impact of
Colombian Traffickers Spreads, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 1988, at 1. See also Tod Robberson,
DEA Money Laundry Pressing on in Panama, Drug Cartels Get Along Without Noriega,
WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1993, at A20 (reporting that Colombian drug traffickers benefited from
other Colombian government ties and continued to launder billions of "narcodollars" through
banks in Panama even after Noriega was arrested).
129. Examples include Colombia, the Russian Federation, and Italy. In Colombia, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a guerilla terrorist network, funds its
rebellion through its extensive connections to organized crime lords, especially by protecting
drug traffickers. See M. Cherif Bassiouni & Eduardo Vetere, Organized Crime and its
Transnational Manifestations, in 1 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 883 (M. Cherif Bassiouni
ed., 2d ed. 1999). Regarding the Russian Federation, see CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, RUSSIAN ORGANIZED CRIME: GLOBAL ORGANIZED CRIME PROJECT
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" Kleptocratic State: a State in which corrupt officials
illegally expropriate public resources for public benefit; 3 '
* Authoritarian State: a State in which an individual or small
group of elites exercises dictatorial control over the State
without reference to the ostensible formal legal system of
the State; 13
1
2-3 (1997); STEPHEN HANDELMAN, COMRADE CRIMINAL: RUSSIA'S NEW MAFIYA (1995).
Regarding Italy, States with weak infrastructures-such as Italy-can be recognized by
conspicuous voids where government and organization should exist. These vacuums are
sometimes filled by non-state tyranny represented by transnational criminal organizations.
See Louise I. Shelley, Transnational Organized Crime: The New Authoritarianism, in THE
ILLICIT GLOBAL ECONOMY AND STATE POWER 25, 32 (H. Richard Friman & Peter Andreas
eds., 1999). For a comprehensive analysis of the relationship between organized crime and
sovereignty, see Winston P. Nagan, Rule of Law: Lofty Ideal or Harsh Reality?, 8 J. FIN.
CRIME 347, 347-49 (2001). Nagan also delivered this article as a theme introduction at the
2000 International Scientific and Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme (ISPAC). See International Scientific and
Professional Advisory Council of the United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice
Programme (ISPAC), The Rule of Law in the Global Village: Issues of Sovereignty and
Universality, Report of the Workshop Held at Palermo, Italy, 11-14 December 2000.
130. See ARNOLD A. ROGOW & HAROLD D. LASSWELL, POWER, CORRUPTION &
RECTITUDE 132 (1963) (stating that a "corrupt [or kleptocratic] act violates responsibility
towards at least one system of public or civic order and is in fact incompatible with
(destructive of) any such system"). Examples of kleptocratic states include then-named
Zaire, Nigeria, and Indonesia. Regarding the then-named Zaire (now the Democratic
Republic of the Congo) Mobutu Sese Seko--one of the world history's most notoriously
corrupt dictators-funneled millions of dollars looted from Zaire's national treasuries into
Swiss bank accounts. See Michela Wrong, The Dinosaur at Bay, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1996,
at 7. Mobutu's theft qualified then-named Zaire as one of the first to be designated as a
kleptocracy. See id. Regarding Nigeria, most Nigerian governmental regimes have been
marred by corruption throughout the past several decades, but it culminated in 1993 when
General Sani Abacha seized power in 1993. See John Erero & Tony Oladoyin, Tackling the
Corruption Epidemic in Nigeria, in CORRUPTION AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: LESSONS
FROM COUNTRY CASE-STUDIES 280, 282-84 (Kempe Ronald Hope, Sr. & Bomwell C.
Chikulo eds., 2000). Regarding Indonesia, see Barbara Crossette, The World: A Global
Gauge of Greased Palms, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, at E3 (designating Indonesia as one of
the most corrupt States in the world). Indonesia has also contemporaneously been designated
the most corrupt State in the world. See Vito Tanzi, Corruption Around the World: Causes,
Consequences, Scope and Cures, 45 INT'L MONETARY FUND STAFF PAPERS 579-80 (1998).
131. Examples include Robert Mugabe's Zimbabwe, most States in the Middle East
(Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, etc.), China, and South Africa (under apartheid). For a
detailed examination of the authoritarian, corrupt nature of the Mugabe government, see
STEPHEN CHAN, ROBERT MUGABE: A LIFE OF POWER AND VIOLENCE 147-180 (2003).
Regarding the Middle East, authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes, particularly Saudi Arabia,
continue to maintain tightly their holds on power even though "people living in the Middle
East ... are demanding that their rights be respected." See Pierre Sane, Human Rights and
the Clash of Cultures, 10 NEW PERSP. Q. 27 (1993); BERNARD LEWIS, THE MIDDLE EAST: A
BRIEF HISTORY OF THE LAST 2,000 YEARS 13-14 (1995) (explaining that authoritarian
governments predominate in the Middle East); SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF
CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER 113 (1996) (stating, "[t]he governments
in the two score other Muslim countries [are] overwhelmingly nondemocratic: monarchies,
one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships, or some combination of these,
usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base .... ). Regarding China, each year
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e Garrison or National Security State: a State in which
concerns with respect to national security have predominant
or significant influence over certain or all areas of state
policy;
13 2
the U.S. Department of State submits to Congress a "full and complete report regarding the
status of internationally recognized human rights" for all member states of the UN. The 2000
report on human rights practices was highly critical of the People's Republic of China.
Specifically, the report states the following:
The People's Republic of China (PRC) is an authoritarian state in which
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the paramount source of power.
At the national and regional levels, Party members hold almost all top
government, police, and military positions. Ultimate authority rests with
members of the Politburo. Leaders stress the need to maintain stability
and social order and are committed to perpetuating the rule of the CCP
and its hierarchy. Citizens lack both the freedom peacefully to express
opposition to the Party-led political system and the right to change their
national leaders or form of government.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2000) (Joint
Comm. Print 2001), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/
eap/index.cfm?docid=684. Regarding apartheid-era South Africa, the authoritarian nature of
the South African apartheid regime was an "enduring consequence" of the "symbiotic
relationship [which] had developed between, on the one hand, the adapted local version of
Roman-Dutch law and, on the other hand, a hierarchical social order in which racial
distinctions and the division between colonist and colonized reinforced each other and a
typically colonial extractive economy." See Francois du Bois & Danie Visser, Symposium:
Export of the Rule of Law: The Influence of Foreign Law in South Africa, " 13 TRANSNAT'L
L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 593, 602 (2003). This transformed Roman-Dutch law was then
"developed with white colonial rule" which culminated in the long apartheid regime. See id.
132. Examples include Israel and the United States. For an explanation of what
constitutes a "garrison State," see generally DAN HOROWITZ & MOSHE LISSAK, METZUKOT
BEUTOPIA [TROUBLES IN UTOPIA] (1990). Regarding Israel, in the face of continuous threats
to its security, Israel developed patterns of militarism now inherent in its national security
doctrine and foreign policy, especially with regard to its dealings with other States in the
Middle East. This development-when viewed in light of the Israeli government's
contemporary practices-has prompted international scholars to label Israel a Garrison State.
See Gabriel Sheffer, Has Israel Really Been a Garrison Democracy? Sources of Change in
Israel's Democracy, ISRAEL AFF., Autumn 1996, at 13-38. Domestic national security has
ever been a monumental priority in the United States. See generally MELVYN P. LEFFLER, A
PREPONDERANCE OF POWER: NATIONAL SECURITY, THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION, AND THE
COLD WAR (1992); DANIEL YERGIN, SHATTERED PEACE: THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR
AND THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE (1977); MICHAEL J. HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON: HARRY
S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE, 1945-1954 (1998);
MELVYN P. LEFFLER, THE SPECTER OF COMMUNISM: THE UNITED STATES AND THE ORIGINS
OF THE COLD WAR, 1917-1953 (1994); WALTER LAFEBER, AMERICA, RUSSIA, AND THE COLD
WAR, 1945-1992 (1967). Recent examples of U.S. Garrison State practices abound.
Following September 11, 2001, the Federal Bureau of Investigation rounded up and arrested
more than one thousand Middle-Eastern men in the United States. See Peter Grier, Which
Civil Liberties--and Whose-Can be Abridged to Create a Safer America?, THE CHRISTIAN
SCI. MON., Dec. 13, 2001, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/1213/pl s2-usju.html.
In October 2001, rules were created to suspend attorney-client confidentiality privileges for
certain categories of this group of detainees. See id. These rules are a part of a "multipiece
package of legal changes which, taken together, represent a profound increase in federal
policing powers." See id. To justify these new policies, the Bush administration reasoned,
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" Totalitarian State: a State which exercises significant or
predominant influence over all aspects of its subjects'
political, social, cultural and economic lives through social
atomization, surveillance, violence and state control over all
associations, activities and institutions; 3 3 and
* Democratic Rule of Law State: a State which practices
"social democratic capitalism" through participatory
institutions which operate without significant recourse to
state violence or oppression. 134
Scholars recognize a distinctive "abuse of sovereignty"
concept. 135 This should not be unusual since the international system
"[w]e're battling an enemy committed to an absolute unconditional destruction of our
society." See id.
133. The prime, historic examples are Nazi Germany and the former Soviet Union. In a
"totalitarian state like ... Nazi Germany ... economic totalitarianism is combined with
political totalitarianism" so that, for example, it was generally impossible for citizens to make
almost any changes to their academic, professional, and political statuses without getting
permission from the political authority. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM
10 (1962).
134. Some examples of note are Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Netherlands, Finland, and
South Africa. Sweden's governmental infrastructure mingles elements of socialism-
specifically redistributive welfare-with capitalism. See HENRY MILNER, SWEDEN: SOCIAL
DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE 186-212 (1989). See PETER DICKENS ET AL., HOUSING, STATES
AND LOCALITIES 3 (1985) ("Sweden, it should be noted, can be taken as the exemplar of
social democratic capitalism."). Regarding other democracies of note, see Evelyne Huber &
John D. Stephens, Globalisation, Competitiveness, and the Social Democratic Model, 1 Soc.
POL'Y & SOC'Y 47-57 (2002) (discussing social democracy in Demark, Finland, Norway,
and Sweden). Regarding South Africa, it arguably constitutes one of the best examples in
history of the inherent value of democracy. The process by which South Africa moved from
apartheid to a highly regarded democratic government in spite of the country's long and
tortured history is an edifying one that should be emulated elsewhere in the world. See
DESMOND TUTU, No FUTURE WITHOUT FORGIVENESS 271-272 (1999). See also ALLISTER
SPARKS, TOMORROW IS ANOTHER COUNTRY: THE INSIDE OF SOUTH AFRICA'S ROAD To
CHANGE 121 (1995); see also Adrien Katherine Wing, Towards Democracy in a New South
Africa, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 689, 691-92 (1995) (book review) (discussing the victory of the
African National Congress in the 1994 elections).
135. Thomas Franck finds the concept of abuse of sovereignty in the context of Security
Council Resolution 687, asserting, "[A] Member State's 'uncooperative behaviour' can rise
to the level of a threat to the peace and implicate the use of collective measures to compel co-
operation with international normative standards beyond those specified as binding
obligations of the Charter .. " See Thomas M. Franck, The Security Council and "Threats
to the Peace: " Some Remarks On Remarkable Recent Developments, in THE DEVELOPMENT
OF THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, PEACE-KEEPING AND PEACE-BUILDING 83, 99 (Rene-
Jean Dupuy ed., 1993). Pieter Kooijmans suggests that "it is an abuse of sovereignty if a
Government refuses to co-operate with the [UN], with the possible consequence that the
[UN] will be forced to intervene, at a later stage, and at much higher cost for the [UN] as well
as for the population, if the crisis becomes really explosive." See Pieter H. Kooijmans, The
Enlargement of the Concept "Threat to the Peace, " in id., at 111, 120. Even political theorist
and skeptic Bernard Crick, who calls sovereignty "a greater curse and a source of more
conceptual confusion than even Clausewitz's dubious doctrine," despite his distaste for it,
does recognize the existence of abuses of sovereignty. See Bernard Crick, The Curse of
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provides both rights and obligations for sovereigns. If they abuse
their rights and disparage their obligations, they could be accused of
being delinquent in international law, which could be described-in
some cases-as an abuse of sovereignty."36 This abuse of sovereignty
de-legitimizes the State's sovereignty. State abuse of sovereignty
fueled by authoritarian, totalitarian, or chauvinist ideologies has
indeed created a crisis of legitimacy for the view of international
relations and law based on the juridical artifact symbolized by the
treaty of Westphalia: the sovereign nation-State. Sovereignty is not a
license to kill, to make war, to commit crimes against the peace, to
disparage basic human rights, to despoil the ecosystem, to subject
human aspirations to the whims of caprice or avarice or to arbitrary
expedience flowing from the barrel of a gun, or to strip human beings
of all vestiges of essential dignity. These kinds of outcomes of
sovereign governance comprise abuses of sovereignty and a general
depreciation of sovereign authority. In short, sovereignty today is a
critical component of the global process of juridical order in the world
constitutive process of authoritative decision. Within that larger
process, the process of sovereignty constitutes and identifies the basic
or fundamental features of those decisions that constitute authoritative
and controlling decision-making and assure its continued vitality as
an institution of governing competence under law.
Sovereignty, THE NEW STATESMAN, May 14, 1982, at 7. The specific abuse of sovereignty
upon which Crick focuses is the Falklands/Malvinas affair. See id. He seems to suggest that
it is by virtue of these abuses that sovereignty remains relevant and important, because when
a "country is threatened, sovereignty becomes meaningful: as in 1914-18 and 1939-45." Id.
136. This characterization was used by the by the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Quinn v. Robinson, with regard to the delinquent nature of a state's commission of crimes
against humanity. Specifically, the Ninth Circuit observed that "crimes against humanity...
violate international law and constitute an 'abuse of sovereignty' because.., they are carried
out by or with the toleration of authorities of a state." See Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776,
799-800 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis added). This characterization was likewise used by an
Israeli District Court regarding the possibility that Argentina might offer sanctuary to
infamous Nazi war criminal, Adolf Eichmann, the decision of which was affirmed by the
Supreme Court of Israel. See Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf
Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 18 (Dist. Ct. 1961), aff'd 36 I.L.R. 277 (Sup. Ct. 1962) (1968).
Specifically, the District Court noted that "[t]here is considerable foundation for the view that
the grant of asylum by any country to a person accused of a major crime of this type and the
prevention of his prosecution constitute an abuse of the sovereignty of that country contrary
to its obligation under international law." Id. at 74 (emphasis added). In other words, any
effort by Argentina to protect a major war criminal such as Adolf Eichmann would constitute
an abuse of sovereignty and would thus not be accorded legal recognition.
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VI. THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF SOVEREIGNTY IN
MUNICIPAL LITIGATION: THE INTERPRETATION OF
DOMESTIC LAW IN LIGHT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Although the UN Charter is a comprehensive constitutional
compact, it is-by the standards of a working national constitutional
model-a weak form of constitutionalism. Sovereign States still have
a great deal of power in the international system. National sovereigns
have highly developed court systems and a significant measure of
international law is often be decided in the national fora of national
sovereigns. This is not surprising since domestic courts routinely
make and apply multi-State private international law. They also have
a vital role to play in making general international law. Clearly,
national courts are a vital element in the ability of law to settle
disputes on an international basis within the framework of the rule of
law. In this Part we criticize the conception of sovereignty
presupposed by the widely discussed decision of the U.K. House of
Lords that the doctrine of sovereign immunity did not protect
Pinochet from U.K. extradition proceedings initiated by a Spanish
judge. 137
Our interest lies in a question faced by the Lords even before
they had to decide whether the former head of State was protected by
the doctrine of sovereign immunity. For the question of the
applicability of the doctrine of sovereign immunity even to arise, the
Lords first had to find that the crimes for which extradition was
sought were crimes that were extraditable under the U.K. Extradition
Act of 1989. In the course of deciding that prior question, there arose
the issue of the "double criminality rule." As Lord Browne-
Wilkinson put it:
The power to extradite from the United Kingdom for
an 'extradition crime' is now contained in the
Extradition Act [of] 1989. That Act defines what
constitutes an "extradition crime." For the purposes of
the present case, the most important requirement is
that the conduct complained of must constitute a crime
under the law of both of Spain and the United
Kingdom. This is known as the double criminality
137. For background regarding this litigation, see Michael Byers, The Law and Politics
of the Pinochet Case, 10 DuKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 415 (2000).
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rule. 138
The first decision of the House of Lords (Pinochet 1),' later
vacated (Pinochet I/),140 presumed that the double criminality rule
would be satisfied if the acts for which extradition was sought were
crimes under both Spanish and U.K. law at the time of the extradition
request. This assumption was rejected by the Lords upon their
reconsideration of the case. 141 The Lords held that the acts in question
must have been crimes under both Spanish and U.K. law at the time
of the allegedly criminal conduct.'42 Under this interpretation of the
double criminality rule, only two categories of the alleged acts of
Pinochet qualified as "extradition crimes:" first, "conspiracy in Spain
to murder in Spain... and such conspiracies in Spain to commit
murder in Spain;" secondly, acts of torture and conspiracy to torture,
but only if the acts of torture and conspiracy to torture occurred after
September 29, 1988, on which date torture became a crime under the
Criminal Justice Act of 1988 enacted by Parliament pursuant to the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
138. Regina v. Bow St. Metropolitan Stipdendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), 1 A.C. 147, 188-89 (H.L. 1999) [hereinafter Pinochet 111).
139. Regina v. Bow St. Metropolitan Stipdendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 1), 1 A.C. 61 (H.L. 1998).
140. Regina v. Bow St. Metropolitan Stipdendiary Magistrate and Others, ex parte
Pinochet Ugarte (No. 2), 1 A.C. 119 (H.L. 1999). The decision of the House of Lords in
Pinochet I was set aside because of a concern that Lord Hoffmann had been a member of
Amnesty Charities. Since Lord Hoffmann was a member of Amnesty, it was thought to
influence his judgment. His membership was, of course, independent of Amnesty's
substantive work because he was in a position of a "trustee," a position that only obliged him
to ensure that the accounts of the organization were regular. From 1989 to 1992, Winston
Nagan, co-author of this Article, was Chairman of the Board of Amnesty International USA
and was consulted by Mr. Peter Duffy of Amnesty International's International Council about
the appointment of Lord Hoffman as an overseer of Amnesty Charities. The central
qualification for this appointment was Lord Hoffman's independence of Amnesty, since it
was his obligation to ensure that every penny raised by the organization was spent in
accordance with the law. It was discovered that Lord Hoffmann was involved with Amnesty
International Charity Limited, a company controlled by Amnesty International, and that he
did not disclose his involvement prior to the hearing. See In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 430 (H.L.
1999). On April 15, 1999, the U.K. Home Secretary, Jack Straw, decided that he would
allow the extradition process to continue. Pinochet was subsequently rearrested on new
charges and his lawyers challenged Mr. Straw's decision. A new decision (on appeal from
the Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division) was then passed on extradition. See
Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and others, ex parte
Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 581 (H.L. 1999) [hereinafter Regina v. Bartle]. After setting aside its
former ruling, the House of Lords impaneled a new committee to rehear the case. Britain's
highest court then upheld the appeal.
141. Pinochet 111, supra note 138 at 188-89.
142. Id.
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Treatment or Punishment 1984 (Torture Convention). 43  As Lord
Browne-Wilkinson stated,
No one has suggested that before section 134 [of the
Criminal Justice Act of 1988] came into effect torture
committed outside the United Kingdom was a crime
under United Kingdom law. Nor is it suggested that
section 134 was retrospective so as to make torture
committed outside the United Kingdom before 29
September 1988 a United Kingdom crime. 144
We give careful analysis to the Pinochet case because it
presents an important technical problem of the relationship between
municipal law and international law, namely, the problem of what the
appropriate standards are for giving meaning to a domestic statute(here, section 134 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988) enacted pursuant
to an international legal rule or standard (in this instance, the Torture
Convention). The complex relationship between municipal law and
international law in the domestic courts of a State significantly
implicate the scope and character of both sovereignty and
international obligation. To make this point more explicit, we might
provisionally hold that in the common law tradition, criminal law
statutes tend to be strictly construed so as not to unfairly encroach
upon the defendant's right to freedom. This raises a number of
important questions: What is the appropriate standard when the
criminal law prescription is derived from an international treaty? Is
the interpreter in the domestic court to be guided by the limitations on
the sovereign's power to restrict liberty through criminal law
prescriptions, or should the interpreter be guided by the standards of
interpretation in Article 2 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties? Since these two approaches to interpretation might lead to
different and, indeed, incompatible results, they could be read as
either restricting or enhancing sovereign immunity, or, conversely,
restricting or enhancing the scope of the international obligation. It is
in these kinds of cases that we begin to see the incremental and
careful ways in which the concept of sovereignty is sometimes
strengthened and sometimes made more porous. In any event, these
143. Since there was no question that extradition for the first set of extradition crimes,
murder and conspiracy to murder in Spain, was blocked by sovereign immunity, the attention
of the Lords then focused on the second set of extradition crimes: acts of torture and
conspiracy to torture occurring later than September 29, 1988.
144. Pinochet III, supra note 138 at 189.
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developments seem to change the character of sovereignty, but not in
ways that are easily predicted.
The implied assumption of the double criminality rule is that
crimes are proscribed by the sovereigns, and for one sovereign to
extradite an accused defendant to another sovereign who wishes to
prosecute that defendant under that sovereign's law, the crime for
which extradition is sought must be also recognized as a crime in the
State from which extradition is sought. The practical problem with
the U.K. Extradition Act of 1989 thus construed is that it does not
specifically account for crimes of a specifically international character
in a substantive sense.
The idea of crimes of universal import substantially finds its
roots in the post-World War II growth of crimes held to be universally
prohibited.145 It is possible that the double criminality rule assumes
that such behavior is generally regarded as criminal. The assumption
is that such crimes would be normally proscribed because the
international criminal law would apply as an incident of the
sovereign's police powers. For these crimes, the double criminality
rule would trivially be satisfied.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson, however, essentially views the issue
of criminality as one that must be created under English law.146
Accordingly, any claim to extradition must ultimately be a function of
the actual nature of English law.'47 This ignores the distinction
between the international prohibition of torture's substantive and
procedural aspects. It might be said, for example, that from a
substantive point of view, torture has long been prohibited and made
criminal under international law.148 On the other hand, the procedure
for applying and enforcing the prohibition is much more problematic.
Since there has been no international juridical institution for
prosecuting crimes of torture or assessing the guilt or innocence of
potential defendants, the enforcement of international law has
perforce been a matter allocated to the more decentralized form of
legal accounting, which is found in domestic institutions. In other
words, the prescription was international, but the application was in
145. The Nuremberg principles established that the violation of the laws and customs of
war is a crime, that the inhumane acts upon civilians in connection with war is a crime, and
that the initiation and waging of and conspiracy to wage aggressive war is a crime.
146. Regina v. Bartle, supra note 140, at 586-89.
147. See id.
148. See generally Winston P. Nagan & Lucie Atkins, The International Law of Torture:
From Universal Proscription to Effective Application and Enforcement, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS.
J. 87 (2001).
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large measure a matter presumed to be the responsibility of individual
States. It has long been recognized that municipal courts are one of
the most important institutions for the direct prescription and
application of general international law. In part, this development is
simply a reflection of the relatively decentralized character of a great
deal of international decision-making in the world arena. Lord
Browne-Wilkinson seems to have ignored the issue of universality
when he held that Pinochet's conduct must have been criminal under
U.K. law at the time it was allegedly perpetrated.149 If the logic of
this decision is correct, then we must assume that the law of
Nuremberg is not the British law, or that this ruling overturns the
Nuremberg precedent and other sources of law that implicate crimes
of a universal character.
We might also consider, for example, whether the construction
and interpretation of the U.K. Extradition Act of 1989, as it relates to
the issue of torture as a universal crime, should not be interpreted in
light of Articles 55 and 56 of the UN Charter. 5 ° The prohibition of
torture is a matter that the UN is obliged to promote. Specifically, as
a member of the UN, the United Kingdom has pledged, inter alia, "to
take joint and separate action in co-operation with the
Organization"'' to achieve "the creation of conditions of stability and
well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples."' 52 It would therefore seem that U.K.
courts, when vested with a juridically cognizable problem, should
provide appropriate levels of construction and interpretation of U.K.
law in order to respect its obligation under the UN Charter.153
Although UN General Assembly resolutions are not technically law,
when they elucidate specific provisions of the UN Charter, they can
provide normative guidance for the construction and interpretation of
national law implicating international obligations. In the UN General
Assembly Resolution that adopted the UN Principles of International
Co-operation in the Detention, Arrest, Extradition, and Punishment of
Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, the
following principles are of direct relevance to the construction given
149. See Regina v. Bartle, supra note 140, at 588.
150. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 55-56.
151. Seeid art. 56.
152. See id. art. 55.
153. There is soft international law support for this Charter interpretation. See Panel
Discussion, A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 371 (1988); see also Paul
Szasz, General Law-Making Processes, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
27, 27-64 (Christopher Joyner ed. 1997).
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by Lord Browne-Wilkinson:
3. States shall co-operate with each other on a bilateral
and multilateral basis with a view to halting and
preventing war crimes and crimes against humanity,
and shall take domestic and international measures
necessary for that purpose.
4. States shall assist each other in detecting, arresting
and bringing to trial persons suspected of having
committed such crimes and, if they are found guilty, in
punishing them.
5. Persons against whom there is evidence that they
have committed war crimes and crimes against
humanity shall be subject to trial and, if found guilty,
to punishment, as a general rule in the countries in
which they committed those crimes. In that
connection, States shall co-operate on questions of
extraditing such persons.
6. States shall co-operate with each other in the
collection of information and evidence which would
help to bring to trial the persons indicated in paragraph
5 above and shall exchange such information ....
8. States shall not take any legislative or other
measures which may be prejudicial to the international
obligations they have assumed in regard to the
detection, arrest extradition and punishment of persons
guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
15 4
The obligation specifically to cooperate and bring to justice
those charged with crimes against humanity is supported by Article
15(2) of International Covenant on Political and Civil Rights 155 and
Article 7(2) of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 56 Both conventions establish the
principle that persons accused of committing crimes against humanity
154. See G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 78, U.N. Doc.
A/9326 (1973), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 230 (1974).
155. See ICCPR, supra note 98, art. 15(2); see also Declaration on Principles of
International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess.,
Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971).
156. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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can be prosecuted in domestic courts under international law. Even if
a State has not incorporated specific international crimes into the
structure of its domestic criminal law, that State will still have an
international obligation to cooperate procedurally, as fully as it can, to
enhance the rule of law in this context. The UN Committee Against
Torture has indicated that, irrespective of whether a State has
specifically ratified the Torture Convention, there exists "a general
rule of international law which should oblige all States to take
effective measures to prevent torture and to punish acts of torture."' 57
Lord Browne-Wilkinson's construction and interpretation of
the U.K. Extradition Act of 1989, relating to both the principles of
double criminality and the conduct date, served to radically diminish
the scope of the prohibition of torture. We submit that the statute is
read in an astigmatic manner and additionally gives an inadequate
conceptual explanation of the scope and essential character of torture
as a universally prohibited crime under international law. It may well
be worth a jurisprudential reminder that procedural law is adjectival;
it exists for the purpose of giving reasonable effect to the principles of
substantive law.
The decision of the House of Lords may be viewed both
positively and negatively. In a positive light, the principle under
international law established by his arrest as well as the Lords'
holding that Pinochet could be extradited to Spain for a criminal act
of torture is important. It sends a compelling message that torturers
who travel abroad may be at risk. Also, given that Pinochet was a
former head of State, the principle is established that the torturer is
not above the law, even if laws enacted in the torturer's own national
jurisdiction seek to protect the torturer from being prosecuted in the
international arena. The point that a head of State, after leaving
office, may be subject to prosecution under international law for an
international crime is certainly a milestone in the jurisprudence of
international criminal law regarding universally proscribed crimes.
Indeed, what is particularly important about Pinochet II is that the
following general point has now been clearly established:
governmental officials accused of universal crimes, such as torture,
can be subjected to prosecution in any part of the world. This is a
particularly important landmark that gives efficacy to the effort to
eradicate torture. But the interpretive limitations imposed by the
learned Law Lords on the scope of the crime of torture read in the
light of the law of extradition and immunity seem to limit unduly the
157. See O.R., M.M., and M.S. v. Argentina, Comms. Nos. 1/1988, 2/1988 and 3/1998,
U.N. GAOR, 45th Sess., Supp. No. 44, at Annex V, para. 7.2, U.N. Doc. A/45/44 (1990).
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importance of international law, and also seem to weaken the human
rights foundations of international legal order. The proper scope of
sovereign governance remains disputed in domestic law fora.
CONCLUSION
We have seen that the term "sovereignty" comes freighted
with many nuanced meanings, generating high levels of ambiguity.
Ambiguity often leads to unconstrained discretion in arenas of
practical decision-making. Correspondingly, the term, when
operationalized, can be used to produce a great deal of social good or
a great deal of social tragedy. As early as 1925, Laski, the British
political theorist, suggested that the term simply be abandoned:
[I]t would be of lasting benefit to political science if
the whole concept of sovereignty were surrendered.
That, in fact, with which we are dealing is power; and
what is important in the nature of power is the end it
seeks to serve and the ways in which it serves that end.
These are both questions of evidence which are related
to, but independent of, the rights that are born of legal
structure. 1
58
The political scientists Lasswell and Kaplan provide a
refinement and a retreat from Laski's "Surrender Doctrine."
According to these authorities:
[I]t is precisely this relation of power to the "legal
structure" (the regime, the structure of authority)
which makes it necessary to invoke such concepts as
sovereignty. It is this very concern with the ends and
means of power which demands the inclusion of
authority into the field of political inquiry. 159
We have demonstrated that the term "sovereignty" must make
core references to the concept of power and the concept of authority.
This itself requires a degree of ambiguity. To lessen the ambiguity,
158. HAROLD J. LASKI, GRAMMAR OF POLITICS 44-45 (G. Allen & Unwin eds., 1925).
159. LASSWELL & KAPLAN, supra note 28, at 177.
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we have recommended that the terms "sovereignty," "power," and
"authority" be systematically contextualized. The reference to
"power," for example, must itself be ambiguous because power might
refer to efficacy or might refer to its exercise without limits.
Similarly, "authority" might refer to responsibility, accountability,
and transparency. Nonetheless, we must clarify the relationships
between sovereignty on the one hand and authority and control on the
other.
This is the dynamic aspect of sovereignty; the meaning of
"sovereignty" must thus be unpacked from the point of view of its
actual operations in social process. When policy and decision are
made a focus of inquiry for the study of sovereignty, a deeper
appreciation of sovereignty's relationship to the complex but broader
world process of constitutive decision-making becomes possible.
These clarifications give us a clue to the operational uses of the term
"sovereignty." These concepts may therefore be better understood
using the method of contextual mapping developed by the New
Haven School of international law. It is clear that by using this focus,
we are asking different questions, but we also illuminate more
precisely the changing nature, uses, and variable contexts of claiming,
managing, and changing sovereignty under current world conditions.
Although the mapping process should be developed with much
greater specificity, a central observable fact is that the sovereignty of
the nation-State, whatever its precise normative and political
boundaries, is an outcome of the global constitutional process.
It should be added that there are many other complex
outcomes of this process, which include, for example, the
constitutional architecture of the European Union, the African Union,
the Organization of American States, and even the framework of
military alliances under the changing character of NATO. These
regional organizations carry attributes of authority and control and, in
turn, reconfigure the framework of decision-making competences that
were exclusive to the sovereign State. The regional organizations
exercise their authority sometimes concurrently with the nation-
States, sometimes in complex patterns of sequential authority. This
makes the interplay between the constitutional architecture of the
various forms of political and legal association under current world
conditions a complex, technical, but vitally important matter. The
strength and the weakness of multilateral constitutional arrangements
are, in some degree, dependent upon the strengths and the weaknesses
of national sovereignty. 60
160. To some degree, these ideas are loosely associated with Judge Lauterpacht's theory
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The trend in modem international law has been in the
direction of -enhancing the authoritative foundations of the
international system and to moving State practice away from State
absolutism. This does not mean that claims to unilateralism may not
trump the solidarity of cooperation and collaboration in the common
interest. This sometimes happens. We must wait and see whether the
current crisis of terrorism will work significant changes in the practice
of international relations based on international law and the authority
of the UN. One trend, however, is clear. Sovereignty as State
absolutism is no longer a tenable precept in international law and
international relations. Sovereignty based on the authority of people's
expectations is a vital and critical element in promoting international
peace and security and enhancing human rights, and it is a basic
element in the foundations and possibilities of good governance as
well as transparent and responsible authority.
of recognition as being reflective of a constitutive rather than an exclusively declaratory
design. See LAUTERPACHT, supra note 14.
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